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SUPPLEMENTAL 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
DATE: May 28, 1980 
RE: No. 79-1404 Pennhurst State 
Halderman and related cases 
The question on the merits--whether the DD Act creates 
a right to receive care and habilitation in a setting that least 
~,------~-~-~--~------~.----..... -------------~~--------~'----------restricts their personal liberty--is plainly in this case. The 
Court of Appeals passed on it and the petitions for cert raise 
it. The issue is slightly confused because the parties 
generally speak of "judicially enforceable" rights. This 
phraseology tends to conflate the cause of action question with 
the issue on the merits. But the petitions do separate the two - "' . 
issues. For example, Joel Klein's brief discusses the right to 
least restrictive treatment at pp. 15-18. 
Paul Shechtman believes that the CA3 erred in its 
interpretation of the statute to impose this rather onerous 
burden on the States. He also thinks that the decision below 
has significantly adverse effects on concerns of federalism. He 
now recommends that the Court grant all four cases (but not the 
.. 
2. 
cross petition), and limit the issues to Questions 2 and 5 as 
stated in the Brief for the United States in Opposition. I 
agree that the grant should be limited. But in view of the 
number of parties--each with its own statement of the questions 
presented--and the unanticipated effect of Thiboutot on the 
cause of action question, I think it would be better if the 
Court formulated the questions it wants briefed and argued. 
PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM 
May 29, 1980 Conference 
List 1, Sheet 2 
No. 79-1404 
PENNHURST STATE HOSPITAL 
Cert. to CA 3 (Gibbons, Weis, S1oviter, I\_osenn, Garth, 
v. Higginbotham; Seitz:-Aldis~ert, Hunter. dissent in part) 
HALDERMAN Federal/Crivil Timely 
No. 79·-1408 
MAYOR of PHILADELPHIA SAME 
v. 
HALDERMAN Federal/Civil Timely 
" 
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No. 79 - 1414 
PARC SAME 
v. 
PENNHURST HOSPITAL Federal/Civil Timely 
No. 79-1415 
COMMRS. OF MENTAL HEALTH 
v. SAME 
HALDERMAN Federal/Civil Timely 
No. 79-1489 
PENNHURST PARENTS ASSOC. SAME 
v. 
HALDERMAN Federal/Civil Timely 
SUMMARY: Petitioners in No. 79-1404, No. 1403, No. 1415, 
and No. 1489 challenge a CA 3 ruling that requires them to 
provide respondent class (present and future residents of the 
-------~ 
Pennhurst State Hospital) with "habilitation" in an -
"environment that infringes least on their personal liberties." .........___ 
FACT~: In May 1974, respondent Terri Halderman, a minor 
retarded resident of Pennhurst State Hospital, filed this class 
action in federal court against the "Commonwealth defendants," 
the petitioners herein in No. 79-1404. The complaint charged 
that conditions at Pennhurst were inhumane and dangerous. It 
sought injunctive and damage relief on constitutional grounds. 
- 3 -
In January 1975, the United States intervened in the action; 
and in June 1975, the Pennsylvania Association for Retarded 
Citizens (PARC) also intervened. Thereafter, the complaint was 
amended to add the "County defendants," petitioners herein in 
No. 79-1415, and the "City of Philadelphia defendants," 
petitioners in No. 79-1408. All apparently place mentally 
retarded persons at Pennhurst. The amended complaint added 
state and federal statutory claims as well as claims for the 
right to treatment in the least restrictive setting. 
In November 1976, ~ cl~ss was certified consisting of all -
present and future residents of Pennhurst. In April 1977, 
after extensive discovery, a 32 day trial was held. In - -=---
December 1977, the trial judge (Broderick, J. ) ruled that 
defendants were violating plaintiffs rights secured to them by 
(1) section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, (2) the 
Pennsylvania Mental Health Act of 1966, and (3) the due 
process, equal protection, and cruel and unusual punishment 
bt; 
clauses of the 8th Amendment. The court found that conditions 
violence, enforced inactivity, and other horrors made it one of 
the worst institutions of its kind. In March 1978, after the 
parties were unable to consent to relief, the court ordered 
relief. The order required the defendants to eventually close 
~
Pennhurst, to open suitable community living arrangements, and 
to develop individualized plans for Pennhurst residents. It 
enjoined defendants from making future placements at Pennhurst. 




to supervise the deinstitutionalization process. Defendants 
appealed that order. 
HOLDING BELOW: CA 3, 6-3 (en bane), affirmed the trial 
court's liability finding and modified in part its decree so as 
to permit "an improved Pennhurst" to remain open but only for 
patients for whom no less restrictive setting is appropriate. 
Majo~LtY-9~nio~: The majority found that the district 
court's factual findings were amply supported . Pennhurst was 
"not merely inconsistent with normalization principles, but 
actually hazardous to residents." It ~hen turned to the legal ____________ _____________, 
_.J_,pni f icance of those facts. It concluded as follov.rs: 
~1 ~:j;:<)L l. That the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of 
~hts Act, 42 u.s.c. § 6010, grants the mentally retarded a 
right to treatment and habilitation. [This statute (hereinafter 
the DDA Act) was pleaded in the amended complaint, but not 
~ 
relied upon by the district court.] § 6010 sets forth a Bill ----of Rights for the mentally retarded, including the right to 
1 
~-- --.,.-~-
"appropriate treatment, services, and habilitation for such 
disabilities."§ 6010(1). 
_ D~ 2. That retarded persons h~e a private~ht of action 
~> un~ Act. Accord !_-Ja_~ht.Q!!_Y· Bevi~a~9_!:!9_, 458 F. Supp. 
~ .. ~v{;610 (D.R.I 1978) (Pettine, J.). CA 3 reasoned that "[a) private 
~ right of action eminently satisfjes the standards articulated in Cor t _y~§.h., . 4 2 2 U. S . 6 6 , 7 8 ( 19 7 5 ) . " The mentally retarded 
were "especial beneficiaries"; the Conference Report on the Act 
. - 5 
stated that the rights of the mentally retarded ''should be 
protected and assured by Congress and th~~our_ts" (emphasis 
added); and private suits would further the purposes of the 
833 (1976), was found to be to the contrary. And in a footnote 
the court suggested that the restricfive approach to private 
right implication enunciated in }:'ou_s:_he _ _B_oss v. Redingt2_n - -· 
u.s. -- - (1978), v1as inappropriate in a civil-rights context. J 
~
See App. 24a n. 16. 
3. That claims under the DDA Act _are cognizable in federal 
court. Here, CA 3 stated its disagreement with CA 4 which had 
held that the language of the Conference Report that such 
rights "should be protected and assured by the Congress and the 
courts" -- referred only to state courts. See United St~tes ~ 
So~omon, 563 F. 2d 1121 (CA 4 1977). CA 3 reasoned that it 
would be most unlikely for Congress to create new federal 
rights enforceable only in state courts. 
4. That, as an alternative ground, state law also provided 
a right to adequate habilitation enforceable in a private 
action. See Pennsylvania Mental Healtb Act of 1966 § 101-704. 
Aguin the private right of action was an implied one. Support 
for this conclusion was found in l!!__!_~.i!_oyce Z, 123 Pitt. L. J. 
(1975), a decision of the Allegheny Common Pleas Court, and in 
Eubanks v. ClaFke, 434 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Pa. 1977). The 
court rejected defendants' arguments that§ 4509(5) and 
§ 430l(d) of the Pennsylvania Act belie any duty on their part 
. - 0 -
to provide treatment.• ~ 
5. That treatment must be provided in the setting least ) 
restrictive of personal liberty. Here, CA 3 relied solely on 
the DDA Bill of Rights which sets forth a right to treatment in 
the "setting that is least restrictive of personal liberty." 
See§ 6010(2). And, again it concluded that th~ DDA created a 
private cause to action to enforce this right. It did not read 
the Act to articulate a per se rule prohibiting institutions. 
Rather, it opined that institutionalization was justified "[i]n 
those individual cases, probably comparatively rare, where 
adequate habilitation can not be accomplished in any setting 
less restrictive than an institution." 
6. From the above, relief followed inexorably: "an 
assessment of each class-members needs must be carried out" to 
determine the appropriate care and the appropriate setting. 
The order seems to contemplate the construction of new 
community-based facilities. 
Dissenting opinion. The in-part-dissenters had no quarrel 
with the facts: conditions were so deplorable as to "merit 
judicial intervention." And th~y "assumed" that the majority 
was correct that · the patients had an 
sue for habilitation under the DDA. 
implied right of action to 
72cA.~ ~ 
But they.l\ par ted company 
These state statutory provisions and arguments based on 
them are set out at 33a to 37a of the petition in No. 79-1489 





on the question of whether the Act imposed a duty on de endants '---------------- -----''-----
to provide the least restrictive treatment possible: 
----~-----------------------
[The) language and structure of the [DDA] Act, the relevant 
regulations, and the legislative history all indicate that 
the states may consider their own resources in providing 
less restrictive treatment. The duty of the states under 
tfie Ace-ls to provide alternative individual habilitation 
o t e extent feasible, which includes i wide variety of 
fiscal concerns. Yet the import of the a ro h taken by 
the ma'orit is exactly the opposite; it · ses a dut to 
p ovi e ess restrictive treatment, regardless of costs or 
alternative funs .... n e ec , the majority transforms 
the u y of providing feasible alternative treatment into 
an entirely different substantive obligation that has 
absolutely no basis in the statutory scheme. 
The~dissenters also concluded that no other statutory provision 
and no constitutional provision mandated deinstitutionalization. 
CONTENTIONS: 
A. No. 79-1489, Pennhurst Parents-Staff Association v. 
Halderman. Petitioner here is an organization comprised of 
parents of residents and staff of the institution. It entered 
the fray late, in opposition to deinstitutionalization, and was 
granted permission to intervene "for the purpose of petitioning 
the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari." See 
App. F. 218a-219a. It contends (1) that the decision below, by . ~ 
transferring to the federal court and a special master the 
principal responsibility for care of the mentally retarded, 
conflicts with principles of judicial non-intervention stated 
in Rizzo v. Goode and Bell v. Wolfish · ; (2) that . the decision 
is contrary to Solomon, supra; (3) that implication of a cause 
of action was unwarranted; (4) that on the merits the CA erred 




that the class here is fragmented and therefore improperly 
certified. The petition does not take issue with the state law 
determination. 
B. No. 79-1408. This is the City of Philadelphia's 
petition. It notes that Philadelphia receives no funds under 
the DDA and argues that it therefore cannot be liable under 
-------------------------------------------------------~ 
that Act. It contends that under state law it has a defense 
under § 4309 and § 4509. See n. 1, infra. And finally, it 
argues that the CA violated sound principles of federalism in 
its extensive grant of power to the district court and to the 
,. 
special master over the mental retardation programs in 
Philadelphia. 
C. No. 79-1415. This is the petition of the County 
to,~ ... 
Defendants. The County defendants argue that CA 3 has 
transformed ~ modest funding statute (DDA allotment for fiscal 
--:::>- "=' =c:::=" "1~ .....-::!s ..... .....--z 
1980 was $65 million) intended to encourage the states to 
improve their mental retardation programs into a federally-
mandated program of treatment and deinstututionalization 
-~--~--'-----~------~--------- --------
enforceable by private right of action. This implication of a --.......___.---....__ __ ______ 
private right is contrary to Transamerican Mortgage Advisors v . J'!T~~ 
Lewis,--- u.s. --- (1979). Moreover, by mandating 
deinstitutionalization CA 3 has impermissibly eliminated state 
and local government policy making prerogatives in this area. 
Cf. Usery. Finally, petitioners argue that § 4509 of the 
Pennsylvania Act provides the counties a defense to the state 
law claims. 






No. 79-1404. This is the state defendants' petition. It 
raises only one new issue: does the United States have standing 
to intervene in this case. Petitioners contend that the 
decision below, which allowed intervention, is contrary to 
Solomon and to United States v. Mattson, 600 F. 2d 1295 (9th 
Cir. 1979). 
No. 79-1414. This is a conditional cross-petition by PARC. 
It seeks review of the CA 3 ruling to the extent that it 
permits Pennhurst to remain open. In so doing, it relies on a 
statement in the legislative hsitory of the DDA that some 
institutions "by their very nature, size, their isolation, 
their impersonality, are unsuitable for treatment, education, 
and habilitation programs." Senate Rep. No. 94-160 (May 22, 
1975). Pennhurst, PARC claims, is such a beast. It notes that 
neither before CA 3 nor here do the city, county, or state 
authorities challenge the factual findings of the district 
court that Pennhurst was an abominable institution. ~ 
R~SPONSES: There are three responses, including the SG' , f ~ 
,, . J ~ 
which argue that CA 3 was correct. The plaintiff-class's ~. "'' 
response and the SG's say that state law provides an alternate ~~ 
ground making review here unwarranted. They further contend 
that judicial intervention was necessary because "a more 
persuasive case of local default can hardly be imagined." The 
PARC response adds a novel twist: it contends that plaintiffs 
could sue under 42 u.s.c. § 1983 because § 6010 of the DDA is a 
law providing for equal rights. Cf. Chapman . v. Houston Welfare 
> 
Rights Organization, 441 u.s. 600 (1979). CA 3 did not consider 
- 10 -
-
this theory. Finally, the responses note that there is no 
conflict on the DDA private right of action issue. 
DISCUSS~QN: Five points merit mention. First, I see no 
reason to review CA 3's determination that Pennsylvania law 
guarantees "habilitation," provides a private right of action 
to enforce that guarantee, and creates duties for the county 
and city as well as the state. {None of the defendants herein 
sought abstention. See PARC brief at 28.} Because this case 
comes to this Court from a federal court exercising pendant 
jurisdiction, that determination is open to review. But this 
Court has generally deferred to federal courts close to the 
scene. See, e.g, Bishop v. Wood~, 426 u.s. 341, 346 {1976). 
Moreover, although the Pennsylvania Act remains unconstrued by 
the state's highest court, it appears that a Pennsylvania 
appellate court has ruled that state law creates a right to 
"minimally adequate habilitation." In re Guzan, 405 A. 2d 1036, 
1038 { 1979} 0 
Second, CA 3's state law ruling insulates half of its DDA 
ruling from review, i.e. there is no reason to consider whether 
DDA creates a right to "habilitation" and a private action to 
enforce that right. 
Third, respondents' contrary arguments notwithstanding, 
state law does not insulate the "right-to-least-~estrictive-
setting" ruling from review. That ruling was predicated solely 
on the DDA. I strongly doubt whether under the Transamerica 
- 11 -
approach the DDA creates such a private right. (Transamerica 
was decided one month before the CA 3 decision in this case, 
but was not cited by CA 3.) Nothing in the language of § 6010 
. 
suggests private enforcement. And the sole passage in the 
legislative history on which the CA relied g.ives scant support: 
[Section 6010 is enacted] in recognition by . the conferees 
that the developmentally disabled, particularly those who 
have the misfortune to require institutionalization, have a 
right to receive appropriate treatement for the conditions 
for which they are institutionalized, and that this right 
should be protected and assured by the Congress and the 
courts. [emphasis added] 
As the defendants note the act contains a "carrot and stick" 
approach -- federal money for approved conditions. It 
contemplates termination o~ funding where states fail to make 
improvements: but there is precious little to indicate that it 
contemplates private actions. 
Fourth, for the reasons given by the dissent, I believe 
that even if t 'he act creates a private right, it is not a right 
to deinstitutionalization. That does seem to have been the 
ultimate congressional preference, but the legislative history 
does not indicate an intent to mandate full scale 
deinstitutionalization. See, e.g., HR Rep. No. 94-58 
[1975] ("[i)t is anticipated that these requirements will prompt 
som~ movem.~nts of patients from State institutions back into 
the communities"). 
" !t· ·,• .. ··-- - ~ 
Five, the other issues raised do not warrant review. It is 
true that the class seems to have fragmented, but the forces of 
institutionalization were well represented in this case. In 
any event, if the decree were left standing, patients (or 
parents of patients) who believe their (or their child's) m~ntal 
condition requires institutionalization would be· able to voice 
that view to the special master. The intervention rights of 
the United States seem entirely academic; it put on some extra 
evidence, but there is no indication that this case would have 
been decided differently were it not present. Likewise, the 
cross-petition has no merit. 
In sum, I would grant, but limit the question to something 
along this line: Does the Developmentally Disabled Assistance 
and Bill of Rights Act, 42 u.s.c. § 6001 et seg. create a 
private cause of action to sue in f~deral court to enforce a 
right to a least restrictive environment? In the alternative, 
if permissible, a GVR in light of Transamerica should be 
considered even though that case was handed down a month before 
the decision here was rendered. 
There are responses and two amicus briefs. 
Shechtman 5/19/80 opn. in petn. 
- , . 
May 29, 1980 
Court ................... . Voted on .... .............. , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . No. 79-1489 
Submitted ................ , 19 . . . Announced ................ , 19 .. . 
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Rehnquist, J ........... . 
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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM 
May 29 , 1980 Conference 
List 1, Sheet 2 
No . 79 ··· 1489 
PENNHURST PARENTS ASSOC. 
v. 
HALDERMAN 
Cert. to CA 3 (en bane} 
Federal/Civil 




May 29 r 1980 Conference 
List 1, Sheet 2 
No. 79-1408 
MAYOR of PHILADELPHIA 
v. 
HALDERMAN 
Cert. to CA 3 (en bane) 
Federal/Civil 
Please see the ~~~~~ in No. 79-1404. 
Timely 
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Court ................... . Voted on ..... ........... . , 19 .. . 
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PENNHURST STATE HOSPITAL Cert. to CA 3 (en bane) 
v. 
HALDERMAN Federal/Civil Timely 
I have been advised (by Tom McGough) that Maine v. 
Thiboutot, No. 79-838, may have special relevance to these 
petitions. The argument goes as fol~ows: (1) respondents have 
a perfectly goo.d § 1983 suit here because § 1983 "encompasses 
claims based upon purely statutory violations of [any] federal 
. . 
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law"; and (2) that it is therefore unnecessary to fuss about 
implied causes of action under the DDA or Pennsylvania law. 
If this argument is sound -- and I think it probably is, 
though I'm not sure that it was generally realized that this 
* was Thiboutot's effect --then it will be difficult to deal 
with this case without reaching the issue of whether the DDA 
requires habilitation in the least restrictive setting. Put 
differently, this case probably cannot be reversed for lack of 
a federal private cause of action; it now seems that there is a 
cause of action (§ 1983), and the issue is what is its content. 
Shechtman 5/21/80 
The effect is this: where the defendant is a federal ,~~~~-/ 
officer or a p~en there will hardly ever b1f. ~rt _____,.. 
impried cause of act1on unless Congress expressly prov'Bes for 
one, Transamerica; but where the defendant is a state here 
will always be a cause of action under § 1983 un~ Congress 
expressly provides to the contrary, Thiboutot. 
, . 
Court Argued ........... ········· 
Submitt~~ .... · · · · · · · · · · · · ·, 19 . .. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 19. 
Voted on...... May 29' 1980 
Assigned · · · · · · · · · · · · , 19 . . . 
Announce~· ................ , 19 .. . . . .. .. .. .. .. 1 No. 79 1404 
.. .. , 9 ... 




JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
.§upmue ~cnrt cf tqt ~tift~ ~tatt.s: 
~a9Jrittgtmt. ~. <.!J. 20.?~~ ..... ~~s.=:=-,. 
June 4, 1980 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: Nos. 79-1404, 79-1408, 79-1414, 79-1415 & 79-1489 
Pennhurst State School and Hospital, etc. 
I was asked to suggest the 
should be granted in ..these cases •. 
cert;:.; 
nc,.;.. 
These petitions challenge the ruling of the CA 3 
requiring petitioners to provide respondent class (prese 
and future residents of Pennhurst State Hospital) with 
"habilitation" in an "environment that infringes least on 
their personal liberties." (The conditional cross-petition, 
No. 79-1414, makes a different claim, which is addressed 
below.) The District Court found for respondents on a number 
of grounds, and theCA 3 concluded that the District Court's 
factual findings were supported by the record. In affirming 
the District Court's judgment in most respects, theCA 3 con-
cluded that the conditions at Pennhurst were sufficiently 
harmful to constitute a violation of both a Pennsylvania 
statute (Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 50, § 4201 et ~· (Purdon)) and 
the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights 
Act (42 U.S.C. § 6000 et ~.) ("DD Act"). In broad outline, 
the Court of Appeals held that the DD Act grants the mentally 
retarded a right to treatment and habilitation; that retarded 
persons have a private right of action under the DD Act; that 
claims under the DD Act are cognizable in federal courts; that 
the state statute, as an alternative theory, also provides a 
right to adequate habilitation enforceable in a private action; 
that under the DD Act treatment of respondents must be provided 
in the setting least restrictive of personal liberty, a right 
that is enforceable in a private suiti and that relief premised 
on an assessment of each class-member s needs was appropriate. 
- 2 -
retarded an enforceable right to treatment in the least 
restrictive setting? (This formulation of the issue includes . 
the private cause of action question, which is separately stated 
in at least one petition.) (Nos. 79-1404, 79-1408, 79-1415, 
79-1489.) (~) Does the DD Act require a State to create and 
fund community-based retardation treatment facilities irrespective 
of cost, available resources, or state policy? (Nos. 79-1404, 
79-1408, 79-1489.) (d) Does the United States have standing to 
intervene in this case? (No. 79-1404.) (4) Was the proper 
scope of federal judicial authority exceeded by the District Court 
and the Court of Appeals? (Nos. 79-1404, 79-1408, 79-1415.) 
(2) Did the Court of Appeals, in an exercise of pendent jurisdic-
tion, correctly construe the Pennsylvania statute to grant the 
mentally retarded an enforceable right to adequate treatment? 
(This formulation includes the implied cause of action question.) 
(Nos. 79-1404, 79-1415.) (6) Should the plaintiff class have 
been decertified? (No. 79-Y489.) The conditional cross-petition 
(No. 79-1414) raises two additional questions: (1) whether the 
DD Act prohibits further admissions to Pennhurst, and (2) whether 
the DD Act requires that Pennhurst be phased out as a residence 
for retarded people. Additionally, there is the issue raised by 
the PARC respondents, addressed also in petitioners' reply memo-
randum, regarding the role of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in providing a 
cause of action. 
Of these issues, two seem not to merit review. First, 
the question of the intervention rfghts of the United States 
(issue 3 above) is insignificant in this context since nothing 
appears to have turned on the United States' participation below. 
Further, the claimed conflict on this point with United States v. 
Solomon, 563 F.2d 1121 (CA 4 1977), and United States v. Mattson, 
600 F.2d 1295 (CA 9 1979), is not sharp, as in those cases the 
United States sued and did not merely intervene. For present 
purposes, Solomon and Mattson are distinguishable from the preseqt, 
cases. Finally, the intervention issue is reflected in the "Ques-
tions Presented" section of only one petition, No. 79-1404. Sec-
ond, the decertification issue (issue 6 above) is raised in only· 
one petition, No. 79-1489. It appears to be a fact-bound deter-
mination not worthy of plenary review. 
The other issues, including those raised in the conditional 
cross-petition, seem to be either sufficiently important or suf-
ficiently intertwined with important issues to merit our consider-
ation. The content of the right under the DD Act and whether that 
right is privately enforceable (issue 1 above) are at the core of 
the dispute. The lower courts' remedial outcome (issue 2 above) 
is closely related to the first issue and has far-reaching policy 
implications for States in their attempt to provide acceptable 
- 3 -
mental health treatment and facilities. Relatedly, the 
federalism issue (issue 4 above) is important, as yet not 
fully resolved in this area, and probably unavoidable. With 
respect to the state law issue (issue 5 above), it is at least 
arguable (see the SG's brief in opposition, at 12) that the 
relief that the lower courts granted is based on their under-
standing of both state and federal law, and thus that thorough 
review of the remedial aspects of this case would require that 
we grant on the state law issue so as not a ariori to limit the 
scope of our review. It may be useful to ad that, whatever '. 
one might think of the advisability of granting on the state law 
issue, the CA 3's state law holding does not insulate all of 
that court 1 s judgment from review. The key aspect of the deci-
sion below is that treatment must be provided in the setting 
least restrictive of personal liberty, and for this theCA 3 re-
lied exclusively on the Bill of Rights in the DD Act. The state 
law was interpreted to provide only "adequate" treatment and 
habilitation. 
The issues in the conditional cross-petition seem 
sufficiently bound up with a proper construction of the DD Act 
that they, too would appear to merit review. As to § 1983, 
that provision 1s role here may well be foreordained by our up-
corning decision in Maine v. Thiboutot, No. 79-838, and that role 
may indeed mean that we do not need to decide whether either the 
DD Act or the state statute have implied causes of action since 
§ 1983 would provide the requisite federal jurisdiction. But we 
certainly should address the issue squarely since we shall have 
these petitions before us in any event, and we may indeed wish 
to specify in our orders granting the petitions that the role of 
§ 1983 should be addressed by the parties. 
In short, I would grant all petitions as to all questions, 
except those relating to · the intervention and decertification 
issues. In No. 79-1404: all questions except No. 3. In 
No. 79-1408: all questions. In No. 79-1414: all questions. In 
No. 79-1415: all questions. In No. 79-1489: all questions ex-
cept No. 3. I would also request counsel to address whether 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 provides a private remedy to enforce the provisions 
of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act 
42 u.s.c. § 6000 ~ ~· 
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SUMMARY: Resps Pa. Assn. for Retarded Citizens, et ~1., and 
*I . 
resps Terry Lee Halderman, et al., oppose petrs' motion- to dispense 
with printing the appendix. 
~/See L.O. memo, dated September 9, 1980. 
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CONTENTIONS: Res.ps, in separate motions, contend that: 
(1) petrs have violated Rules 30.2 and 30.3 by failing to 
advise resps of those portions of the record that petrs consider 
unnecessary, and by failing to advise resps of the costs of 
printing resps' designated portions; moreover, petrs have made 
no attempt to agree on the content of the appendix; (2) this case 
is fact-extensive, and resps' designations are essential to a 
proper resolution of the issues; and (3) the costs of printing 
the appendix are not prohibitive for these financially resource-
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SUMMARY: Petrs in No. 79-1415 moved to dispense with the 
requirement of a joint appendix, and request that the case be heard 
on the original record, together with the joint appendix already 
before the court filed by petrs in No. 79-1404, 79-1408, and 79-1415. 
I k.. 11eo.-J dt nC) r~61rr 
,-7<:)-l- -J.e, ~ r...n-1-. 
~ 
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FACTS: The Suburban County petrs, on behalf of themselves 
and the petrs in No. 79-1404, 79-1408, and 79-1489 furnished resps 
their designation of the parts of the record to be included in the 
appendix, which included docket entries, relevant pleadings, key 
orders of the DC, a contempt application, ano a reply. Petrs in 
No. 79-1414 did not furnish resps any designation. In response to 
the designation of the Suburban County petrs, the Halderman plaintiffs 
and the United States, resps in No. 79-1404, 79-1408, 79-1415, and 
79-1489 furnished designations of parts of the record to be included 
in the appendix with total contents in excess of 1,200 pages and 
estimated cost of $30,000. 
CONTENTIONS: Petrs submit that the United States and Halderman 
resps are in violation of Rule 30.2 which directs that "counsel 
should include only those materials the Court should examine." Petrs 
note that a joint appendix by petrs in No. 79-1404, 79-1408, 
and 79-1415 has already been filed with the Court in conjunction 
with theiT pet~~ for- ce~~· ~-This appendix includes the DC's opinions 
and orders, the opinions from CA 3, and the relevant statutory : , 
provisions, totalling 240 pages. 
Petrs further contends that the issues raised are entirely 
legal in nature involving basic statutory construction, and that 
there is no detailed factual issue that requires extensive review 
of testimony or exhibits. Consequently petrs submit that the joint 
"\ 
appendix already filed with the Court is sufficient~ 
DISCUSSION: Petrs' request seems reasonable; however, a response 
would be helpful. 
9/9/80 Caldwell 
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No. 80-738 
IN RE PENNHURST PARENTS-STAFF 
ASSOCIATION 
Peti tic;m. f<_Jr Mandamus and '>.£Al l/ 
Proh1b1t1on 0 
Also Motion to Dispense with 
Printing the Petition 61~T 
Also Motion to Expedite the Time 
for Filing Responses 
CA 3 
SUMMARY: Pending cert, petrs Pennhurst Parents-Staff Association 
seek mandamus and prohibition to require the DC (ED Pa., Broderick) to 
qomply with this Court's partial stay entered June 30, 1980. That 
order stayed the DC's order to relocate the mentally retarded residents. 
Alternatively, petrs seek modification of that order, alleging that 
the DC has ordered numerous relocations since ent;ry of this Court's 
partial stay. Resp:> Halderman, et al. allege that petrs lack standing 
to seek mandrunus as to the DC's allegedly reasonable exercise of its 
- 2 -
1/ 
FACTS:- Regarding petrs' application for stay, this Court stated 
on June 30 that it "is granted . to the extent that the judgment mandates 
the movement of residents of the Pennhurst facility to 'appropriate 
community living arrangements. ' In all other respects, the motion 
2/ 
is denied." -
On July 15, the DC acknowledged the partial stay and ordered that: 
[N]o resident of Pennhurst will be trans-
ferred to a corununity living arrangement in 
accordance with prior orders of this Court 
unless and rn1til the Hearing Master has deter-
mined that such transfer is voluntary. The 
Hearing Master shall schedule a hearing for 
each Pennhurst resident for whom a community 
living arrangement has been prepared, for the 
purpose of determining whether the transfer 
is voluntary. 
Petrs state that in recent months, a Hearing Master appointed 
by the DC has conducted hearings in 17 cases. In all but one of these 
he has ordered placel'nent of the Pennhurst residents in the CLA to 
which he or she has been designated. In fact, the Hearing Master 
recently concluded one hearing in which both parents strongly objected 
to placement of their profoundly retarded child in a CLA by determining 
that the transfer was 'voluntary" because, in his opinion, the pror{nindly 
retarded 19-year old in question would have opted for placement in the 
CLA if he were competent to speak for himself. 
PETRS CONTEND: (1) Mandamus and prohibition are necessary to 
assure compliance with this Court's order, which was intended to 
prohibit court-ordered relocation of Pennhurst residents until after 
completion of plenary review in this case. The DC's interpretation 
.!_/See L.O. memo dated June 24, 1980, rega.cding the original 
application for stay. 
2/100 s. Ct. 3046 (1980). Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, 




of the partial stay order. renders it a nullity, and deprives petrs 
of important interim protections which this court intended to confer. 
(2) The DC's imposition of a "voluntariness" inquiry is in 
error, and is meaningless in this context. It forces the Hearing 
Master to speculate as to the wishes of the profoundiy retarded resi-
dents, even over the objections of pdrents. This issue is compounded 
by the Hearing Master's practice of appointing counsel to represent 
the views of the Pennhurst residents while opposing the position of 
the residents' parents. 
(3) The DC continues to order the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
and the county to develop and fund CLA's for present and prospective 
Pennhurst residents, contrary to this Court's partial stay order. 
(4) As a minimum, this Court should modify its earlier order by 
stay ing the DC orde r compelling petrs to provide suitable CLA's for 
all present and potential Pennhurst residents, and by requiring that 
all activities of the Special Master and the Hearing Master implementing 
the DC's mandate that petrs provide suitable CLA's be stayed pending 
final disposition on cert. 
(5) Mandamus is clearly appropriate in this case. As this Court 
stated in Vendo Compan;y: v. Lektro-Vend Corporation, 434 U.S. 425, 427 
(1978), mandamus "is available to a party who has prevailed in this 
Court if the lower court doe s not proceed to execute the mandate, or 
disobeys and mistakes its meaning. II 
(6) Irreparable injury continues to devolve upon petrs. Sub-
stantial sums of unrecoverable money are being expended at the rate 
of $70,000 monthly for t he Special Master's and Hearing Master's 
activities for a total of $1.8 million to date. Moreover, the entire 
... ·-
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placement process continues to exact a devastating toll on the 
persons involved. 
(7) Petrs move to dispense with the provisions of Rule 33 which 
require that petns such as the one at issue conform with the format 
of standard typographic printing, and that the Couri accept this.fype-
written petn instead. Petrs contend that compliance with Rule 33 would 
unduly delay the Court's resolution of this matter. Additionally, petrs 
urge that the provisions of Rule 27b,which permit resps 30 days in which 
to file a response,be shortened to ten days in view of the urgency of 
this matter. 
Petrs Pennhurst State School and Hospital, et al., join in the 
request for mandamus or modified stay so as to penni t them to continue 
the Commonwealth's placement program unhindered by unnecessary delay 
( \.....,/ and improper divers ion of funds. 
RES?S TERRI LEE HALDERMAN, ET AL. CONTEND: (1) Petrs' claims 
are factually unsupported: no person has left Pennhurst or is leaving 
without the approval and support of the Commonwealth or respective County 
since these defendants approve the proposed site and ensure staff train-
, ~ 
ing. Of the 21 hearings held, 19 have involved parental approval of 
a proposed placement; and all of those involved County and Commonwealth 
approval.· Of the two cases where parents did not approve the placement, 
exceptions were filed which will be heard by the DC. (See chart in 
Resps' response at 7A.) 
\ 
(2) Petrs lack standing to seek mandamus. Standing would exist 
only if parents were objecting to forced movement of minor children. 
Only one such objection has been lodged and a hearing in the DC as to 




(3) Mandamus is inappropriate since petrs failed to appeal 
the DC's July 14 order. However, the precise issue raised here is 
in fact pending in the DC (on motions to stay) and in CA 3 (in 
No. 80-2341). 
(4) An interlocutory order such as the instant one is not subject 
to review on mandamus except in rare circumstances not present here. 
And this Court has no obligation to supervise interlocutory orders 
which might be unrelated to the merits, despite the grant of cert. 
(5) Extraordinary relief is inappropriate where petrs have 
delayed four months in challenging the DC's order. 
(6) Modification of the stay is equally inappropriate since 
petrs are now requesting precisely what this Court declined to grant 
in its June 30 order. 
( 7) Irrep arable harm would resul t to resps if the relief 
requested is granted. Experts selected by the Special Master filed 
a report with the DC on July 15, 1980 detailing their findings that 
Pennhurst residents were dying preventable deaths, and that medical 
care at Pennhurst is shockingly inadequate. It was in this context 
that the DC issued orders to the Corrunonwealth defendants on July 22 
to show cause why they should not be held in contempt. 
( 8) Finally, resps urge that the request to dispense. with the 
printing requirement be denied because the language of Rule 27.1 
permits no exception: nor does Rule 27.2(b) permit a shortening of 
the 30 days within which to file a response. This case presents no 
emergency, as petrs delayed four months in s e eking mandamus. 
PENNHURST ASSOCIATION OF RETARDED CITIZ ENS (PARC) CONTENDS: 
(\- (1) Accelerated consideration of the mandamus petn is inappropriate. 
The precise relief r:equested is currently pending before the DC and 
" 
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CA 3 on a full record at the instance of petrs Pennhurst Assn. and 
the Corr~onwealth. 
(2) With respect to this Court's partial stay, the ·DC stated 
in its opinion of July 28 regarding its July 14 order: 
We understand the word "mandate" to have its 
literal meaning--that this Court cannot mandate 
the movement of residents from Pennhurst to the 
community. Nothing in the Supreme Court stay 
order suggests, however, that voluntary trans-
fers may not proceed, nor that this Court may 
not ensure that residents and their families 
make informed judgment as to sllch voluntary 
placel'r\8nt. 
The DC's interpretation of the partial stay order was correct since 
the focal point of the original stay application is forced movements. 
The stay order denied petrs' requests in all other respects. 
(3) Finally, resps PARC move to vacate this Court's partial stay 
because: (a) this Court denied a similar stay application in this 
case on Oct. 1, 1979; (b) CA 3, sitting en bane denied a stay; (c) petrs 
are not likely to prevail on the merits; and (d) injury and regression 
at Pennhurst will continue, and will be deprived of the benefits of 
cornnmn i ty 1 i vin g. 
DISCUSSION: Numerous assertions have been made by the parties 
which are largely peripheral. The threshold issue in this matter is the 
proper interpretation of the term "mandate" as employed in this Court's 
partial stay orde r. If the Court intended that word to be read -literally, 
then the DC's decision to permit voluntary transfers would not seem to 
\ 
be inconsistent, and mandamus should be denied. If on the other hand 
the Court inte nded to stay all relocations, then this Court may wish to 
modify its earlier language to ensure its directives are followed. 
- 7 -
The motion to dispense with the formal printing of the appendix 
should be granted under a relaxed reading of the Rules. 
The request for an accelerated response seems unnecessary since 
responses have been filed by all but the DC (who has stated that he 
will do so upon order of this Court) . 
Finally, PARC's motion to vacate the partial stay should be 
denied since it merely advances contentions earlier addressed and 
rejected on the original stay application. 
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To: Mr. Justice Powell December 2, 1980 
From: Greg Morgan 
No. 79-1404; 79-1408; 79-1414; 79-1415; 79-1489: 
Pennhurst State School and Hospital, et al., v. Terri Lee 
Halderman, et al. 
Questions . Presented 
This lawsuit, which is before the Court on 
consolidated writs of certiorari, presents four questions. 
One: what rights, if any, does the Developmentally Disabled 
Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 u.s.c. § 6000, et seq., 
secure for developmentally disabled persons? Two: if that Act 
does secure rights, do the developmentally disabled have a 
private right of action to enforce them? Three: if that Act 
secures rights which the developmentally disabled may sue to 
enforce, did the Court of Appeals in this case exceed its 
remedial powers? Four: if Pennsylvania law secures rights for 
the developmentally disabled, does that law support the relief 
ordered in this case? 
Background 
Pennhurst Center for the Mentally Retarded is a 
state-operated institution for the mentally retarded from 
several counties of Pennsylvania. Approximately 1,200 mentally 
retarded persons live at Pennhurst. Seventy-four per cent of 
these residents are either "severely" retarded (IQ between 20 
and 35) or "profoundly" retarded (IQ below 20). The other 
residents are "mildly" retarded (IQ between 52 and 69) or 
"moderately" retarded (IQ between 36 and 51). A significant 
per cent of Pennhurst residents are physically handicapped in 
addition to being mentally retarded. About half of the 
residents were committed to Pennhurst by court order; the other 
half were placed in Pennhurst by a parent or guardian. 
Pennhurst receives both state and federal funds. Of -
the federal funds that Pennhurst receives, the largest portion 
by far comes from the Medicaid program ($5.8 million in fiscal 
1975-76). A smaller amount of federal funds comes through 
grants made under the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and 
Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6000 et seq. (hereinafter DD 
3 0 
Act or Act) ($660,000 in fiscal 1975-76). Pennsylvania has 
committed about $3.4 million to the improvement of Pennhurst, 
and an additional $21 million for the design and construction 
of other facilities into which approximately 900 Pennhurst 
residents can be moved. 
This class-action lawsuit was begun in 197 4 by a 
Pennhurst resident, Terri Lee Halderman, on behalf of herself, 
other Pennhurst residents, and persons who might reside at 
Pennhurst in the future. She alleged that the conditions and 
treatment at Pennhurst violated rights secured by the federal 
constitution and by Pennsylvania's Mental Health and Mental 
Retardation Act of 1966, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 50, §§ 4101, et 
seq. (Purdon) (hereinafter Pennsylvania Mental Health Act); and 
she sought monetary and injunctive relief. Other mentally 
retarded persons, the United States, and the Pennsylvania 
Association for Retarded Citizens (PARC) , subsequently 
intervened as plaintiffs. In addition to endorsing Halderman's . 
claims, the intervening plaintiffs alleged violations of the DD 
Act and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 u.s.c. § 794. They --......-.... ........... -
also added as defendants various officials and mental-health 
administrators from the five Pennsylvania counties that send 
mentally retarded persons to Pennhurst. 
The District Court for the Eastern District of At~ 
Pennsylvania (Broderick, J.) made extensive f indin9.._s of fact -
about the conditions and treatment at Pennhurst. The District 
Court found that Pennhurst wards were vilely filthy, noisy, and 
4 0 
crowded. It found that Pennhurst residents had been harmed 
physically by other residents or by staff, and that Pennhurst 
residents were commonly subjected to physical and chemical 
restraints. The District Court also made "findings of fact" 
about the Pennhurst residents. It found that some residents 
had lost skills they once had had, and that many residents 
"could be moved immediately into the community and would be 
able to cope with little or no supervision." On these 
findings, the District Court held that the conditions and 
@ 
treatment at Pennhurst v.Jolate ; the Eighth Amend nt, 
cY 
tl"ie Due 
Process Clause and th '3 qual Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, th~Rehabilitation Act, and the 
~ennsylvania Mental Health Act. The District Court did not 
address the question whether the conditions and treatment at 
/hJ 
~Ju...t 
Pennhurst also violate the DD Act. In relief, the District ~ 
Court ordered that Pennhurst residents be moved 
~i~o "community living arrangements," that the 
from Pennhurst "i- J>i!)... 
conditions at &.uaf~& 
~ Pennhurst be improved pending these moves, a~ that Pennhurst 
~ 
then be closed. The District Court appointed a Special Master 
to supervise the execution of this order. 
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit {! /l 3 
substantially affirmed the District Court's remedial order. ~ 
1 
612 F.2d 84 (1979) (en bane) ~ Appendix to Petition for 
Certiorari in No. 79-1489 (hereinafter Petn), at 4a. 
~ 
But 
unlike the District Court, the Court of Appeals supported the ---------· 
order by a construction of the DD Act. The Court of Appeals r------------__....__..--- - -
held that § 6010 of the Act, the "Bill of Rights" provision, ~JJ-fo 
secures for the developmentally disabled a "right to treatment 
and habilitab ....> n" (Petn, at 22a} in the "least restricti~ 
environment" appropriate for the individual person (Petn, at 
v 
45a}. Applying the test of Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975}, 
the Court of Appeals further held that the developmentally 
disabled have a private right of action under the DD Act to - ~ -..... 
enforce their right to treatment. (Petn, at 22a-29a}. The 
lJ..t-1 ~urt of Appeals did not construe the DD Act to require the 
~~closing of l::g~~~tio~lke Pennhurst, but the court did 
~ , _JAfind in the Act a congressional preference for 
~·a7 On the basis of these conclusions, 
Court of Appeals remanded the case to the District Court 
"individual determinations by the court, or by the Special 
Master, as to the appropriateness of an improved Pennhurst for 
each patient" (Petn, at 60a-6la} • Also, because it had 
concluded that "deinstitutionalization is the favored approach 
to habilitation" in the least restrictive environment (Petn, at 
62a}, the Court of Appeals instructed "the court or the Master~ 
[to] engage a presumption in favor of placing individuals in &M.. 
[community livings arrangements]" (Petn, at 63a). ~
The defendants petitioned for certiorari in Nos. 79- ~ 
1404 1408 d 1415 k . 1 h . t ~ . , - , an - , see 1ng rever sa • T e 1n erven1ng 
Pennhurst Parents-Staff Association petitioned for certiorari 
in No. 79-1489, also seeking reversal. Plaintiff PARC 
petitioned for certiorari in No. 79-1414, seeking reversal only 
6. 
of that part of the Court of Appeals' judgment which allowed 
Pennhurst to remain open. (Although PARC is a petitioner for 
this limited purpose, I shall refer to it as a respondent for 
clarity sake. Thus, "petitioners" refers only to the 
defendants and to the intervening Parents-Staff Association.) 
Contentions 
The Court of Appeals ordered the District Court to 
determine the "appropriate" treatment in the "least restrictive 
environment" for each developmentally disabled person residing -- - I 'Z-0 o 
at Pennhurst, and to engage in the presumption that a~
"community living arrangement" is the "least restrictive .J.o 
~ 
environment." In effect, this order requires that Pennsylva2:i
must us~ funds, and the federal funds it receives, ~ 
provide to developmentally disabled individuals the treatment (j. 
~ 
which the District Court finds "appropriate," and that 
Pennsylvania must provide such treatment in the type of 
institution which the District Court finds "least restrictive." 
Petitioners raise several challenges to this order and the 
statutory construction on which it rests. 
I. The DD Act. 
A. Petitioners 
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals 
misconstrued the DD Act. In petitioners' view, the Act is a 
f~ which encourages states to improve their 
7. 
services for the developmentally disabled, but which does not 
secure rights for the disabled or impose an affirmative funding 
duty upon the states. Assuming that the Act does secure 
rights, petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals defined 
those rights more broadly than § 6010 allows. 
Petitioners contend that their construction of the 
Act as a funding statute is consistent with the Act's language, 
structure, and Jegislative history, and that the Court of 
Appeals' construction of the Act is inconsistent with those 
indicia of congressional intent. For statutory language 
supporting their construction, petitioners cite § 6000 (b) (1), 
which states: 
It is the overall purpose of this 
chapter to assist States to assure that 
persons with developmental disabilities 
receive the care, treatment, and other 
services necessary to enable them to 
achieve their maximum potential through a 
system which coordinates, monitors, plans, 
and evalutates those services and which 
ensures the protection of the legal and 
human rights of persons with developmental 
disabilities. 





(emphasis added by petitioners). Petitioners contend t hi't ~ ~ 
statement of purpo~e makes clear that Congress intended 
systematically to improve care for the developmentally disabled ~~ 
by encouraging state planning and coordination. Petitioners 
further contend that § 6010, upon which the Court of Appeals 
and respondents rely, is not to the contrary. That sect ion 
provides in pertinent part: 
8. 
(1) Persons 




right to appropriate 




(2) The treatment, services, and 
habilitation for a person with 
developmental disabilities should be 
designed to maximize the development 
potential of the person and should be 
provided in the setting that is least 










Petitioners concede that this section recognizes a ~ight to 1/ ~a-t-
treatment, but they contend that the recognition of this right ______.-, 
differs significantly from an affirmative obligation upon the 
states to fund the exercise of that right. Cf. Harris v. 
McRae, U.S. ---, 48 U.S.L.W. 4941, 4947 (June 30, 1980); 
Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 u.s. 397 (1979). 
The structure of the Act, petitioners contend, also 
reveals that Congress intended the Act to be a funding statute. 
Thus, several of the provisions of Subchapter I of the Act 
concern the manner and amount of federal funding. § 6002 
("Federal Share"); § 6004 ("Records and audit"); § 6006 
("Recovery of expenditures ..• "); § 6012 ("Protection ..• of 
individual rights; State allotments ... "). The other three 
subchapters concern federal funding to particular entities. 
Subchapter II, § 6031, et seg. ("University Affilitated 
Facilites"); Subchapter III, § 6061, et seg. ("State 
Allotments"); Subchap ter IV, § 6081, et seg. ("Special Project 
Grants"). Furthermore, the Act expressly states in two 
sections the conditions to receipt of federal funds. The first 
- ,. . 
9. 
such section, § 6011, conditions a state's receipt of federal 
funds upon the assurance by the state to the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services (hereinafter Secretary) that each 
state plan to receive funds will have in effect for each 
developmentally disabled individual a "habilitation plan" 
meeting certain requirements. The second such section, § 6063, 
conditions a state's receipt of funds under Subchapter III upon 
the state's subrnissi0n to the Secretary of a plan acceptable to 
the Secretary "for the provision of services for persons with 
developmental disabilities." In light of these two express 
obligations upon states receiving funds, petitioners contend 
that Congress would not implicitly have obligated states, 
independent of the receipt of federal funds, to pay for 
"appropriate" treatment "in the least restrictive environment." 
In petitioners' view, therefore, the structure of the Act 
reveals that § 6010 is an expression of federal policy, not an 
affirmative obligation upon the states. 
As read by petitioners, the legislative history of 
the Act supports this construction. According to petitioners, 
Congress meant the Act to coordinate prior aid programs which 
overlapped in some respects and were inadequate in others. 
Petitioner concedes that one of Congress's aims was to foster a 
trend away from placing the developmentally disabled in large 
institutions, like Pennhurst, and toward placing them in 
smaller facilities nearer their horne, like community living 
arrangements. But, petitioners contend, the legislative 
- ,. . 
10. 
history clearly shows that Congress recognized 
deinstitutionalization to be a "trend," not a medically or 
scientifically proven solution to the question of how to treat 
the developmentally disabled. Therefore, petitioners contend, 
Congress did not require deinstitutionalization 
unconditionally. Rather, petitioners contend, Congress chose 
funding incentives to promote state planning and coordination 
of services. That Congress did not express a preference in the 
Act for community living arrangements is made even clearer, in 
petitioners' view, by the fact that amendments passed in 1978 
allow states to use all of their federal funds for any one of 
three other kinds of systems for the delivery of treatment and 
services. § 6063 (b) (4) (A) (ii) ~ 
In sum, petitioners contend that the Act facilitate~~ 
treatment by the states of the developmentally disabled, but
does so through financial incentives which leave to the states' ~ 
discretion the means of delivering that treatment. Petitioners 
contend, therefore, that § 6010 neither secures for the 
developmentally disabled a "right to treatment" in the "least 
restrictive environment" nor imposes upon the states an 
obligation to fund such a right. 
Assuming that § 6010 does secure a right for the fj ~ ;;}-
developmentally disabled and does impose upon states the duty~~ 
I 
to fund the exercise of that right, petitioners contend that C/13 
the Court of Appeals defined the scope of that right and duty~~ 
/]t' ,~L-5) ~ 
~ 
11. 
more broadly than § 6010 allows. Petitioners rely upon 
subsection (3) of § 6010, which provides: 
The Federal Government and the States 
both have an ? bligation to assure that 
public funds are no t provided to any 
institutional or other residential program 
for persons with developmental disabilities 
that --
(A) does not provide treatment, 
services, and habilitation which is 
appropriate to the needs of such persons; 
or 
(B) does not meet the following 
[six] minimum standards " 
In contrast to subsections (1) and (2) of § 6010, subsection -
h " ( 3) speaks specifically of governmental obligations. 
Accordingly, petitioners contend, this subsection must be read 
to define the scope of the generally phrased right recognized 
by subsections (1) and (2). Accord, Kentucky Association for 
Retarded Citizens v. Conn, (W.O. Ky., March 21, 1980). 
Petitioners further contend that the obligation imposed in 
subsection ( 3) is alternative. Under this reading, the states 
can satisfy that obligation either by providing "treatment ... 
which is appropriate to the needs of such per sons" (subsection 
(A)) or by meeting the six "minimum standards" (subsection 
(B)). And, petitioners contend, the states can satisfy either 
obligation without closing its large institutions or engaging 
in a presumption that most developmentally disabled must be 
moved to community living arrangements. Thus, petitioners urge 
this Court to reverse the Court of Appeals' remedial 
instructions to the District Court even if this Court agrees 
12. 
with the Court of Appeals' that § 6010 secures rights for the 
developmentally disabled. 
B. Respondents. 
Respondents contend that § 6010 secures a right for 
developmentally disabled persons who have been placed in 
institutions and that the Court of Appeals correctly described 
that right as one to "appropriate treatment" in the "least 
restrictive environment." Like petitioners, respondents rely 
upon the language and legislative history of the Act. 
Respondents contend that the language of § 6010 is 
clear and mandatory. Subsection (1) states, "Persons with 
developmental disabilities have a right to appropriate 
treatment, services, and habilitation for such disabilities." 
Respondents acknowledge that the introductory sentence of § -
6010 labels the subsections "findings" of Congress, but 
respondents contend that the unqualified language of subsection 
( 1) renders the "right to appropriate treatment" more than a 
hortatory express ion of federal policy. Rather, respondents 
contend, the "right" in subsection (1) is precisely what it 
purports to be: a right secured by the Act for the 
developmentally disabled. 
Respondents contend that the right secured in 
subsection (1) is supplemented by the mandatory obligation in 
subsection (3) that the federal and state governments use 
"public funds" only for institutions and programs which provide 
appropriate treatment and meet certain minimum standards. In 
13. 
this regard, respondents dispute petitioners' . contention that 
subsection (3) e s tablishes an alternative between providing 
"appropriate" treatment and meeting the six minimum standards. 
Respondents read the "or" in subsection ( 3) to be conjunctive 
because provision (A) and (B) of subsection (3) are both 
phrased negatively (see page 11, infra). Thus, respondents 
read subsection (3) as if it obligated the federal and state 
governments not to fund institutions which "[fail to] provide 
treatment ... which is appropriate ... or [fail to] meet the 
... minimum standards." Finally, respondents contend that the 
1978 amendments to the Act make clear that Congress meant § 
6010 to secure certain rights. The amendment upon which 
respondents rely was added to the Act as the last sentence of § 
6010, and reads: "The rights of persons with developmental 
disabilities described in findings made in this section are in 
addition to any constitutional or other rights otherwise 
afforded to all persons." 
Respondents contend that the Act's legislative 
history supports their construction. Respondent United States 
describes the Act, and particularly § 6010, as a compromise 
between a bill proposed by the House, which relied on financial 
incentives to promote better treatment for the disabled, and ~ 
bill proposed by the Senate, which was concerned primarily with 
preventing violations of the rights of institutionalized 
'individuals. According to the f_onference Report ( which both 
respondent United States and respondent PARC cite, "[t]he 
14. 




121 Cong. Rec. 




describes the steps taken by Congress and various lower federal 





to those individuals 
Congress learned 
in institutions. 
from its own 
investigations, and from the judiciary's experience, that large 
institutions like Pennhurst are unable to help the 
0Pvelopmentally disabled 
development they have. 
fulfill 
PARC 
whatever potential for 
labels such institutions 
"custodial," and contrasts them to smaller institutions which 
more nearly resemble "normal" family life in their size and 
activities. In light of this legislative history, PARC 
contends, Congress must have meant to prohibit "custodial" 
;nstitutions and to promote the theory of "normalization" by 
providing in § 6010 (1) a right to "treatment, services, and 
habilitation" and by stating in § 6010 (2) a preference for 
treatment "in the setting that is least restrictive of the 
person's person liberty." 
In sum, respondents contend that the Court of Appeals 
correctly construed § 6010 of the Act to secure for the 
developmentally disabled a "right to treatment" in the "least 
restrictive environment" and to impose upon the states the 
obligation to assure that each developmentally disabled 
individual receives such treatment in such a manner. 
15. 
II. The Right of Action. 
The Court of Appeals relied upon Cort v. Ash, supra, 
in concluding that residents of Pennhurst have an implied 
private right of action under the Act to sue for enforcement of 
the rights and obligations established by the Act. When this 
W-<..... 
that ~lui. 
(198 31 ~ 
Court granted the petitions for certiorari, it requested 
counsel brief and argue the question whether 42 u.s.c. § 
provides a private right of action to enforce the Act. 446 
------....__ - - - -
U.S. 100 S.Ct 2984 (June 9, 1980). 
A. Petitioners. 
Petitioners contend that 42 u.s.c. § 1983 does not 
provide a private right of act ion to enforce the Act because 
the Act itself provides the exclusive remedy for violations. 
Maine v. Thiboutot, --- U.S. --- (1980), 48 U.S.L.W. 4859 (June 
25, 1980) ("The only exception [to the private right of action 
under § 1983] will be in cases where the governing statute 
provides an exclusive remedy for violations of its 
terms.") (Powell, J., dissenting) . 
Petitioners contend that the Act vests the authority 
of enforcement exclusively in the Secretary or in a state 
agency required by the Act. Petitioners contend that the 
authority of the Secretary or the state agency is exclusive 
because every section of the Act which can be read to establish 
a right also vests an enforcement authority either in the 
Secretary or in the agency. For example, § 6011 requires 
states receiving federal funds to have in effect "habilitation 
16. 
plans" for each institutionalized individual. Section 6011 
also requires the states to "provide the Secretary satisfactory 
assurances" that such plans are in effect. See also, § 6005 
(Secretary shall require states receiving funds to employ 
qualified handicapped individuals on terms required pursuant to 
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973). Section 6012 requires states 
receiving funds to create an agency to advocate the rights of 
the developmentally disabled. Section 6012 also requires the 
State to submit reports describing the agency to the Secretary, 
who shall allot appropriate funds to assist the agency. See 
also, § 6067 (states receiving funds must create "State 
Planning Council" and submit such reports as Secretary 
requires). 
In petitioners' view, even § 6010 is to be enforced 
exclusively by the Secretary, although § 6010 itself contains 
no enforcement provision. According to petitioners, the 
enforcement provision for § 6010 is found in § 6063 (b) (5) (C), 
which requires states receiving funds to submit to the 
Secretary a plan containing, inter alia, 
assurances satisfactory to the Secretary 
that the human rights of all persons with 
developmental disabilities who are 
receiving treatment, services, or 
habilitation under programs assisted under 
this chapter will be protected consistent 
with section 6010 of this title (relating 
to rights of the developmentally disabled). 
Petitioners also contend that the Act gives 
exclusively to the Secretary the means of enforcement. For 
17. 
example, § 6063 requires that states submit, as a condition to 
receiving funds, a "plan for the provision of services for 
persons with developmental disabilities," and that section 
empowers the Secretary to disapprove a state plan after notice 
and a hearing. § 6063 (c). Section 6065 empowers the Secretary 
to terminate funds to a state if the Secretary finds a failure 
to comply with § 6063 or with any of the Secretary's 
regulations. As read by petitioners, the Act also assures that 
the Secretary will receive the information needed in order to 
enforce the Act. For example, § 6009 requires that states 
submit to the Secretary, as a condition to receiving funds, 
such evaluations of state services as the Secretary requires. 
In addition, § 6012 requires the state advocacy agency to 
submit reports to the Secretary, and § 6067 (b) ( 4) requires the 
State Planning Council to submit periodic reports to the 
Secretary. Finally, petitioners note that several of these 
provisions expressly provide that the developmentally disabled, 
through relatives and advocates, are to participate in the 
plans and hearings. That the Act vests enforcement power in 
the Secretary while ensuring participation by the individuals 
affected makes clear, to petitioners, that Congress meant the 
Secretary exclusively to enforce the Act. 
Petitioners also contend that private enforcement of 
the Act would conflict with the Act's purpose of encouraging a 
systematic delivery of services to the developmentally disabled 





Petitioners contend that this because the right "to 
appropriate treatment" in "the 1 ast restrictive environment," 
assuming that the Act secures th t right, is amorphous and ill-
defined. In petitioners' view, the purposes of the Act will be 
defeated if the definition of that right and its contours is 
left to varying interpretations by courts in individual 
actions. 
In sum, petitioners ontend that § 1983 does not give ?to~ -
the developmentally 
~~ 
private right of action to 
enforce the Act, even v. Thiboutot, supra, because ~11YJ 
means of enforcement~~~ 
--~--~---r'-----~----------------'--- /~~ 
the Act vest 
exclusively in the Secretary. Petitioners also contend that a 
private right of action will defeat the purpose of the Act. 
~~= 
1983 and § 6010 give ~
B. Respondents. 
Respondents contend that both § 
the developmentally disabled a private right of action to /~J'j? q 
enforce the Act. /:.. D J IJ 
' ,. 
Respondents contend that the developmentally disabled ~ 
have a private right of action under § 1983 to enforce the Act 
because the Act does not vest enforcement authority exclusively 
in the Secretary or anyone else. Respondents suggest three 
reasons why Congress could not have meant the Secretary to have 
exclusive enforcement authority. First, respondents contend 
that the Secretary's most severe sanction -- termination of 
funds provided under the Act -- would be inadequate to remedy 
violations of the Act, for the funds provided under the Act 
. ~ 
19. 
constitute a minor portion of the total federal funds the 
states receive to conduct programs and institutions for the 
developmentally disabled. The much larger funding under 
Medicaid, for example, would be unimpaired, and the violations 
of the Act therefore would be unsanctioned. Second, 
respondents contend that the Secretary will be loath to 
exercise this severe sanction where the violations of the Act, 
although real, are isolated or relatively minor in comparison 
to the violations at Pennhurst. See Cannon v. University of 
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704-06 (1979). Third, respondents 
contend that § 6012 which requires that states establish 
advocacy systems to pursue "legal and other appropriate 
remedies to insure the protection of the rights of ... persons 
who are receiving treatment, services, or habilitation within 
the State" -- refutes the notion that Congress meant to vest 
exclusive enforcement authority in the Secretary. 
Respondents also contend that the developmentally 
disabled have an implied private right of action under § 6010 
to enforce the Act. Respondents rely on the four-part test of 
Cort v. Ashe, supra, and pay particular attention to Congress' 
intent, Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979); 
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 u.s. 11 
(1979). Thus, respondents first contend that the 
developmentally disabled are the beneficiaries of the Act and 
that state use of federal funds is a matter of federal concern. 
Respondents then contend that the Act does not establish an 
20. 
exclusive remedy, for the reasons stated above. Finally, 
respondents contend that the legislative history reveals a 
congressional intent to imply a private right of action. For 
example, committee reports refer to the remedial role of 
federal courts and the Conference Report states that the rights 
secured in the Act "should be protected and assured by Congress 
and by courts." 121 Cong. Rec. 29819 (1975) (emphasis added). 
Respondents contend that these statements, read in light of the 
state of the law of implied rights of action in 1975, evince 
Congress's intent to allow private enforcement of the Act. 
In sum, respondents contend that the developmentally 
disabled have a private right of action under § 1983 because 
the Act does not establish an exclusive remedy, and that the 
developmentally disabled have an implied private right of 
action under § 6010 because Congress intended to imply such an 
action and such an action satisfies the other three parts of 
the Cort v. Ash test. 
III. The Remedial Order. 
A. Petitioners. 
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals 
exceeded its remedial authority in ordering the District Court 
to make individual determinations of the "appropriate" 
treatment and "least restrictive environment" for each of the 
Pennhurst residents. Relying on Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 
(1970), petitioners contend that a federal court which finds a 
- ,. . 
21. 
violation of federal law by a state is limited in the relief it 
can order. According to petitioners, the federal court can ?Ze-/-r-:s 
grant declaratory and injunctive relief against the payment of ~ 
....... --- --
federal money, ~ cannot order the expenditure of state money.~/L 
Thus, petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals could ~ 
enjoin federal funding to Pennhurst under the Act, but co~
~~ 
not require the state to expend the money necessary to _ 
determine "appropriate" treatment for each individual and then ~~ 
~w-j~ 
Ros::;~ .. 
to provide that treatment. 
Even putting aside the principle of 
petitioners contend that Congress has limited in § 6003 the 
relief which a federal court may1~rder for a violation of the 
Act. That section provides: (f l, V o 3) 
Except as otherwise specifically provided, nothing in 
this chapter shall be construed as conferring on any 
Federal officer or employee the right to exercise any 
supervision or control over the administration, 
personnel, maintenance, or operation of any facility 
for persons with developmental disabilities with 
respect to which any funds have been or may be 
expended under this chapter. 
Because petitioners find no specific provision authorizing the 
District Court or the Special Master to supervise the 
administration of Pennhurst, petitioners contend that the Court 
of Appeals violated § 6003 by ordering the District Court, or 
the Special Master, to make individual determinations of the 
appropriate treatment for each of the Pennhurst residents. If 
some provision of the Act is read to authorize such an order, 
rather than merely the termination of funds, then petitioners 
22. 
contend that Congress has exceeded its authority under the 
Spending Clause. This is so, petitioners contend, because 
Congress cannot dictate how a state must spend its own money 
stmply because the state has accepted federal money, even if 
only temporarily. 
Finally, petitioners object to the remedial order on 
the ground that it approves only one type of treatment 
"normalization" -- as "appropriate" treatment, and because it 
approves only one type of institution "community living 
arrangements as the "least restrictive environment." 
Petitioners contend that judgments about "appropriate" 
treatment and "least restrictive environment" must be left to 
professionals in the field of developmental disabilities. 
B. Respondents. 
Respondents contend that the Court of Appeals acted 
within its remedial powers in ordering an individual 
determination for each Pennhurst resident because that order is 
limited to the remedy necessary to cure the violations of the 
Act. Milliken v. Brad~ 433 U.S. 267, 279-88 (1977). 
Respondents rely upon the District Court's essentially 
unchallenged findings that Pennhurst failed to meet the 
individual habilitation needs of its residents and failed to 
meet the six minimum requirements of § 6010 (3) (B). Given 
these findings, respondents contend that the objective of the 
remedy is the same as the objective of § 6010: to create a 
mechanism for ensuring that each patient receives "treatment, 
23. 
services, and habilitation which are appropriate to his needs." 
Respondents further contend that the presumption in favor of 
community living arrangements is proper because the Act 
expresses a preference for such arrangements over institutions 
like Pennhurst. Finally, respondents contend that the use of a 
Special Master to oversee the remedial order is both proper and 
customary in large class actions such as this one. 
Respondent PARC stresses one contention more 
vigorously than does respondent United States. PARC urges this 
Court to reverse that portion of the Court of Appeals' judgment 
which reversed the District Court's order that Pennhurst be 
closed. PARC does not agree with the District Court that the 
Act establishes a per se prohibition on large institutions like 
Pennhurst, but contends instead that the Act establishes a 
strong presumption that such institutions do not provide 
"appropriate" treatment in the "least restrictive environment." 
In this case, PARC contends, petitioners have failed to rebut 
that presumption by showing that Pennhurst does provide such 
treatment in such a manner. On that basis, PARC urges that the 
District Court order closing Pennhurst be affirmed. In 
contrast, respondent United States agrees with the Court of 
Appeals that an improved Pennhurst must be available to treat 
those developmentally disabled persons for whom Pennhurst is 
the "appropriate" treatment in the "least restrictive 
environment." 
24. 
Discussion of the First Three Questions. 
On the basis of the briefs filed by the parties to 
this lawsuit, the especially sound brief filed by amicus 
Congress of Advocates for the Retarded, et al., and my own 
reading of the Act, I conclude that the opinion of the Court of 
Appeals erred both in its construction of the Act and in its 
~ -
assessment of the necessary remedy. I am also convinced that 
several of the District Court's "findings" are "clearly 
erroneous," in that they are not findings of fact but 
conclusions about highly debatable scientific and medical 
questions. However, in light of those findings of the District 
K)_ ..L ~ 
Court which are proper findings of fact, I am unsure whether ~4' 
this Court must reverse or affirm. The reasoning by which I ~J 
reach this~cl~s ion is tentative, for I find these three 4 .J9.c,~ 
questions to be interwoven and very difficult. 





Having read carefully the briefs of respondent United 
States and respondent PARC, I cannot say that I know precisely 
what obligation respondents believe the Act imposes upon 
states. The brief of the United States is particularly vague 5 G s ~ 
on this point. For example, if the District Court in this case ~ 
were to decide that 900 Pennhurst residents should be moved 
into community 1 i v ing arrangements, but Pennsylvania owns or 
funds only enough such arrangements to house 50 0 residents, 
would respondents argue that Pennsylvania must use its money or 
-~ - - -- --
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federal money to develop more such arrangements? Or, if the 
Pennsylvania legislature decides as a general matter that it 
disapproves of community living arrangements, but the District 
Court finds from expert testimony that such arrangements 
provide "appropriate" treatment in the "least restrictive 
environment" for some number of developmentally disabled in 
Pennsylvania, must Pennsylvania fund such arrangements? 
Neither b~ asserts that the state ~ provide the ' ~ 
funds in these or similar situations; but that must be what en~ ~ 
i9-G respondents mean to assert, for they support the Court of 
4~ 
Appeals' judgment and that judgment seems to impose such a J-u-s·~·~ .. d~ 
requirement upon the states. See, ~' Petn, at 6la ("Sin~
the statutory rights to treatment ... vindicate the individual A. s~ 
patient's fundamental interest in personal liberty, it is only 
fitting that the Commonwealth be required to undertake a case-
by-case investigation into how each person's rights may best be 
facilitated.") 
Assuming that respondents read the Act to impose an 
affirmative funding obligation on states, independent of the 
receipt of federal funds under the Act, I am fairly convinced 
that respondents are wrong. To be sure, § 6010 recognizes in 
the plainest terms that the developmentally disabled have a 
right to "appropriate" treatment: "Persons with developmental 
disabilities have a right to appropriate treatment, services, 
and habilitation for such disabilities." Congress hardly could 
have chosen plainer language, as petitioners concede. But 
26. 
~t- ~~-
1nothing in the Act obligates states to fund the exercise of  
that right. 
.... --- Petitioners are correct that every section of the ~ 
Act which concerns funding, with the exception of § 6010 (3),~ 
is a provision tying restrictions or duties to the receipt of ~~ 
federal funds given to states under the Act. Those sections do ~~ 
not obligate the state to fund the exercise of the right td~h-1-
"appropriate" treatment; they simply require the states to 
perform certain tasks as a condition to receiving federal funds 
. ~----~'------------~-----------------'- =-, under the Act. The only other funding provision, § 6010 (3), 
---...__ 
is precisely the opposite of an obligation upon states to fund 
the exercise of the right to "appropriate" treatment, for it 
imposes "an obligation to assure that public funds are not 
provided" to any institution or program which fails to provide 
"appropriate" treatment or fails to meet the Act 1 s minimum 
standards (emphasis added) . 
In response to the Act 1 s lack of an affirmative ~ 
funding obligation, respondents argue that Congress could not 1-o ~~ 
have intended to recognize a right which cannot be enforced. 
This argument can be met in two ways: 
First, there is an excellent reason why Congress 
would have recognized this right but not have made it 
judicially enforceable by imposing upon states the obligation 
to fund its exercise: It is not within judicial competence to I~ 
~~tel-eA. -L-en force an obligation upon states to fund "appropriate" -----......--... ---
treatment for the developmentally disabled. The extensive  





conducted enough hearings and investigations before passing the 
Act to have recognized that the "appropriateness" of treatment 
for a given person who is developmentally disabled is a medical 
or scientific judgment, not a legal one. Because nothing in 
the Act provides courts with any measure of "appropriateness," 
a lawsuit to enforce the right to "appropriate" treatment might 
be little more than a contest between expert witnesses. 
Congress should not be presumed to have intended this result 
without some indication in the Act that Congress meant to 
oblige the states to fund the exercise of this right. 
Second, there is at least a serious question whether 
Congress has the authority to obligate states, independent of 
the receipt of federal funds, to fund a certain right or type 
of institution. The briefs only touch on this point, and I do 
not fein to know the answer to the question. It suffices to 
say, however, that the existence of this question might explain 
why Congress would recognize a right and encourage its 
protection, but not affirmatively obligate states to fund the 
~ 
exercise of the right. 
Thus, I conclude that the Act does not obligate the 
states, independent of the receipt of federal funds under the  
Act, to fund a right to "appropriate" treatment. H I 
- de.;r 
owever, ~-
also conclude that the Act does impose a different obligation ~ 
which is independent of the receipt of federal funds under th~~ 
- ~rb 
Act: the obligation of § 6010 (3) (A) & (B) that the states  
assure that "public funds" are not provided to institutions or if 
}o~ 
28. 
programs which fail to provide "appropriate" treatment or fail 
to meet the Act's minimum standards. 
As a preliminary matter of construing § 6010 (3) (A) & 
(B) ' I disagree with petitioners' contention that this 
subsection establishes alternative means of compliance. The 
subsection is ambiguous because of the unhappy use of two 
negatives, but common sense suggests that the "or" must be read 
as a conjunt i ve. States therefore must assure that "public ------funds" are not provided to any institution or program which 
fails to meet either the requirement of (A) or the requirement 
of (B) • 
As to the obligation itself, I find nothing in the Act 
to suggest that Congress tied this negative obligation to the 
receipt of funds under the Act. Certainly,§ 6000 (3) itself 
does not provide that this obligation is imposed only on states 
which receive federal funds. Nor do I see the federalism 
problem in this obligation. Being a negative obligation, it 
does not raise the question of congressional power which would 
be raised by an affirmative obligation to fund the exercise of 
a right. 
In sum, I conclude that the Act obligates states to ~~ 
assure ---that no public funds are provided or ~~ 
---------------------------------------------
to institutions 
programs which fail to provide "appropriate" treatment or which 
------------~------'---~-------'------------------fail to meet the Act's minimum standards. Thus, as I construe 
the Act, the Court must address the question whether the -
29. 
developmentally disabled have a private right of action to 
enforce that obligation. 
II. Private Right of Action. 
I conclude that the developmentally disabled have a 
As to § 6010, I am inclined to agree with respondents 
that Congress intended the developmentally disabled to have a 
---------------------~ - .._._ --
right of action to enforce the Act. The language of the Act 
supports this view, for~ 6012 expressly contemplates the 
-creation by the states of "a system to protect and advocate the 
... 
rights of persons with developmental disabilities." The 
{%:> l~islative history also supports this view, for the hearings 
and reports appear to be replete with the assumption that -
federal courts would play an active part in enforcing the Act, 
presumably in private suits. 
As to § 1983, I am inclined to agree with 
respondent's again. In concluding that there is an implied 
private right of action under § 6010, I necessarily conclude 




That conclusion would seem to dispose of 
petitioners' only argument against a § 1983 right of action. I 
have one reservation, however, which the petitioners did not 
raise. 
Section 1983 provides a private right of action 
against state officials who, acting under color of state law, 
30. 
deprive a person of "any right, privilege, or immunities" 
secured by the Constitution or laws. Thus, to hold that § 1983 
provides a right of action to enforce the obligation of § 6010 
-------------- -~-----------------------------------(3) , the Court must hold that the developmentally disabled have 
a "right" or "privilege" to the assurance that public funds -------------
will not be provided to institutions failing to satisfy the 
~ ----------------------------~-------------requirements of § 6010 (3) (A) & (B). It is not immediately 
-------------------~ 
obvious to me that § 6010 (3), in addition to obligating states 
to make this assurance, gives the developmentally disabled have 
a "right" to this assurance. But such a holding does strike me 
as logical, for § 6010 (1), as I read it, recognizes that the 
developmentally disabled have a right to treatment of the 
quality which § 6010 (3) means to promote. Reading § 6010 as a 
whole, I would hold that the developmentally disabled have a 
right which is deprived when a state fails to assure that 
public funds are not provided to institutions which fail to 
satisfy the Act. 
In sum, I conclude that the developmentally disabled 
have a private right of action under both § 1983 and§ 6010. 
III. The Remedial Order. 
Having concluded that § 6010 (3) is the only 
obligation which the Act imposes on the states and that the 
~-----------~---------'-----~---------------------------developmentally disabled have a private right of action to 
enforce that obligation, I next address the question of what -
remedy a federal cour~n ord~r if it finds that ., ""l!at:~s 
31. 
that "public funds" are ~vided to an 
-1 
institution which does not satisfy the requirements of § 6010 
(3) (A) & (B). I find this the most perplexing of the three 
questions. 
Because the obligation in § 6010 (3) is essentially a 
negative one -- to assure that public funds are not provided to 
certain institutions the remedy for a violation is a 
declaratory judgment and an injunction. Contrary to 
~---------------------respondents' suggestion that such a remedy would be inadequate 
because it would affect only the relatively small amount of 
funds given to states under the Act, such a remedy would affect 
all "public funds." This is so because § 6010 (3) refers to 
"public funds," not just to funds provided under the Act. 
Thus, an injunction to remedy a violation of § 6010 (3) would 
---------------------------~------------------------~· ---
affect all the funds with which a state operates its 
institutions. 
The more difficult question about remedy is how a 
federal court is to discern whether a state has violated § 6010 
(3). For the same reason that a court should not attempt to 
enforce a right to "appropriate" treatment under § 6010 (1), a 
court should not attempt to discern whether a state-funded 
institution provides "appropriate" treatment as required by § 
6010 (3) (A) & (B) • However, unlike § 6010 ( 1) , § 6010 (3) ~ fo 0 II a) 
provides a judicially enforceable standard. Subsection ( 3) 
--7 ( obligates 
the states "to assure that public funds are not :~ 
provided to any" institution which fails to satisfy the Act's ~
32. 
requirements. This obligation can be read to leave to the 
state the determination whether institutions funded by the 
state provide "appropriate" treatment and meet the Act's 
7 
minimum requirements. The task of the court, therefore, is to 
determine whether the state has established and put into 
continuing effect such procedures or systems as are necessary 
to make the assurance which § 6010 (3) requires. 
What I have said thus far disposes of most of the 
Court of Appeals' opinion and judgment. There remains only the 
question whether the Court of Appeals correctly construed the 
Act to express a preference for "community living 
arrangements." I address this question briefly, although I am 
unsure where it fits in my analysis. 
Nothing in the Act expresses a preference for 
Act with particular kinds or sizes of institutions. Rather, 
Congress attempted to encourage thoughtful and coordinated 
delivery of services through whatever kind of institution --
by states to the developmentally disabled. That this was 
Congress's design is obvious from Congress's initial findings, 
§ 6000 (a) (3), from Congress's statement of its "overall" and 
"specific" purposes, § 6000 (b) (1) & (2), and from Congress's 
encouragement of experimental institutions and programs. § 
6000 (b) (2) (C); § 6081. That Congress could not have expressed 
a preference for community living arrangements is also obvious 
33. 
from the Act's definition of such arrangements: II such 
services as will assist persons with developmental disabilities 
in maintaining suitable residential arrangements in the 
community " § 6 0 0 0 1 ( 8 ) E ) • A s rna 11 ins t i t u t ion might 1 a c k 
some of the services, or the coordination of services, 
available at a large institution. For that reason, a small 
institution could not provide a "suitable" arrangement for some 
developmentally disabled individuals. Thus, the very 
definition of these arrangements makes clear that Congress did 
not express a preference for them. -To be sure, Congress was concerned in passing this 
Act with the treatment and conditions for individuals in 
institutions. The legislative history makes this quite clear, 
and in the Act itself Congress found that "it is in the 
national interest to strengthen specific programs, especially 
programs that reduce or eliminate the need for institutional 
care." § 6000 (a) (5). But the Court of Appeals and respondents 
have erred in reading "institutional care" to refer only to 
large institutions like Pennhurst. Nothing in the Act defines 
"institution" or "institutional care." Furthermore, a 
--------------------------------------
community living arrangement is as much an "institution" as 
Pennhurst, and is as susceptible to deterioration and 
inadequacy as Pennhurst. Thus, the Act should not be read to 
express a preference for any type or size of institution. To 
the extent that Congress expressed any preference, it was for 
34. 
the care of the developmentally disabled outside of any type of 
institution. 
Conclusion. 
Having concluded that the Court of Appeals erred both 
@ in its construction of the Act an~n its remedial order, I 
nonetheless question whether this Court should reverse or 
affirm the Court of Appeals' judgment. I am unsure because 
petitioners ap~rently did not dispute in the Court of Appeals 
------~ LW~ ..._, ,.._.._ -~ ...,. 
the District Court's findings about the conditions and 
~----------------------------------'--------------Perhaps petitioners will argue that 
conditions at Pennhurst have improved since the District Court 
made its findings. But accepting those findings as well-
founded, I am constrained to conclude that respondents have 
proven that Pennsylvania failed to meet its obligation un9 er § 
~ -----'----------------~---------6010 (3) that is, Pennsylvania failed to assure that 
Pennhurst, which receives public funds, provides "appropriate" 
treatment and meets the Act's minimum requirements. However, I 
will not now pursue this problem further. Nor will I address 
the question whether the lower courts correctly construed state 
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SUPPLEMENTAL BENCH MEMORANDUM 
To: Mr. Justice Powell December 4, 1980 
From: Greg Morgan 
Nos. 79-1404, 79-1408, 79-1414, 79-1415, 79-1489: 
Pennhurst State School and Hospital, et al. v. Halderman, e:'t " 
al. 
To my great embarassment (and disbelief), I have 
discovered that I overlooked the brief of respondent Halderman 
while preparing my bench memorandum for this case. (My 
recitation of respondents' contentions derives from the briefs 
of the United States and the Pennsylvania Association for 
Retarded Citizens (PARC)). Having discovered my oversight and 
having read Halderman's brief, I believe that I should address 
7 
2. 
briefly Halderman's contentions that the Court should dismiss 
this case as improvidently granted. 
I. Dismissal as Improvidently Granted. 
Respondent Halderman contends that the Court should 
dismiss this case as improvidently granted, and she offers 
three reasons in support. I find her contention unpersuasive. 
First, Halderman notes that the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services {Secretary) recently published proposed 
regulations defining and interpreting the DD _Act. 45 Fed. Reg. 
31006, 31014 at § 1385.2 & 1385.3 {c). Halderman specifically 
notes that the Secretary has defined "institution" in such a 
way as to include community living arrangements and other 
relative small, familial-type institutions as well as large 
institutions like Pennhurst. Also, the Secretary has inserted 
mandatory language for the qualified language of § 6010 {2). I Thus, the regulations provide that treatment "shall be provide~ ,. 
in the setting that is least restrictive of the person's 
personal liberty," while the Act provides merely that treatment 
"should be provided" in that setting. From these regulations, 
Halderman surmises that "disability law" is undergoing 
important changes and, accordingly, that this Court should not 
review the Act. Halderman relies on Muriel v. Baltimore City 
Criminal Court, 407 U.S. 355, 358 {1972). 
The publication of proposed regulations does not 
----------------~ ~ 
warrant a dismissal. Few cases involving a social-welfare or -
3. 
civil-rights statute, or a government agency, would ever be 
decided if this Court dismissed cases as improvidently granted 
because the relevant agency published regulations. 
Furthermore, these regulations do not change the nature of the --- -claims, or the parties, or the record before the Court. In -fact, their only readily obvious effect is to support my belief 
(Bench Memorandum, at 33) that Congress did not express a 
preference in the Act for community living arrangements because 
the Act's reference to "institutions" applies to all types of 
institutions. That these regulations do not "change" the case 
before the Court distinguishes this case from Muriel, supra, 
where the Court dismissed as improvidently granted a challenge 
to Maryland's Defective Delinquency Law. Also distinguishing 
the cases is the fact that Muriel involved a constitutional 
challenge rather than a statutory one, and the fact that the 
proposed changes in the law in Muriel were statutory changes by 
the Legislature rather than regulations by the Secretary. 
Second, Halderman notes that Congress recently passed 
The Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, Pub. Law 96-
247 (May 23, 1980). This Act directs as a matter of priority 
that federal funds available for improving institutions are to 
be used for that purpose. § 9 (a) • From this Halderman 
contends that dismissal would be appropriate to allow federal 
agencies to use federal funds to improve institutions like 
Pennhurst. The passage of this Act does not warrant a 
dismissal because it says nothing about the question whether 
4. 
the DD Act obligates states to use funds to provide 
"appropriate" treatment in the "least restrictive environment." 
Third, Halderman contends, without supporting 
argument, that O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Home, 48 U.S.L.W. 
4842 (June 23, 1980), supports a dismissal. This contention is 
frivolous. O'Bannon held that residents of a nursing home have 
no constitutional right to a hearing before Medicaid payments 
to the operator of the home are terminated. Thus , 0 'Bannon 
obviously has nothing to do with this case: and it would not 
warrant a dismissal in any event. 
In sum, the suggestion that this case be dismissed as 
improvidently granted is meritless. I therefore stand by the 
tentative conclusions in my bench memorandum, with one 
reservation -- that I have not considered sufficiently yet th~ ) 
question whether state law supports the judgment and remedial t 
order of the Court of Appeals. 
lfp/ss 12/4/80 
79-1404 Pennhurst 
MEMO TO FILE 
I record here, for convenience, the more important 
~
views expressed by Greg in his excellent~£ 12/2/80. 
Pennhurst, with 1200 mentally retarded persons, 
receives both state and federal funds - including Medicaid. 
In this class action suit under §1983, §6010 of the 
Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act 
(the Act) and under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, 
the DC found shocking conditions at Pennhurst, and held that 
the treatment or lack of treatment violated the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments and certain other legislative acts, 
but did not consider whether the DD Act was violated. It 
ordered Pennhurst resiaenW be moved to "community living 
arrangments", and that Pennhurst be closed. CA3 generally 
affirmed, but - unlike the DC - also supported extensive 
relief by holding that §6010 of the DD Act (the Bill of 
Rights provision thereof) secures a "right to treatment and 
habilitation" of developmentally disabled persons. 
CA3 also held that a private right of action 
exists under the DO Act, as well as under §1983. CA3 did 
not require, as the DC had)a closing of Pennhurst in so many 
terms. It remanded for "individual determinations ••• as 
2. 
to the appropriateness of an improved Pennhurst for each •• 
• patient"; and created a "presumption in favor of placing 
individuals in community living arrangements". 
Questions Presented 
1. What rights does the DD Act provide for 
developmentally disabled persons? Section 6010(1) provides: 
"'--------. 
11 Persons with developmental disabilities have a 
right to appropriate treatment, services, and 
-;,habilitation for such diabilities". 
~ In view of the foregoing language, petitioners 
concede that this section recognizes a right to treatment, _ _.... 
but no right to compel a state to fund the exercise of the 
treatment right. Subsection 3 of §6010 provides, in part: 
"The federal government and the states both have 
an obligation to assure that public funds are not 
provided to any institutional or residential 
program" that does not provide appropriate 
treatment and meeting prescribed minimum 
standards. 
Greg concludes (and I agree) that the Act cannot 
fairly be construed to obligate a state, independently of 
the receipt of federal funds, to provide its own funds to 
assure "appropriate" treatment. But the Act does obligate a 
state to assure that no public funds (whether state or 
federal) are provided to institutions or programs that fail 
to provide "appropriate treatment" or that fail to meet the 
Act's minimum standards (see memo p. 28). 
3. 
Every section of the Act that concerns funding, 
except §6010(3), is a provision tying restrictions or duties 
to the receipt of federal funds provided to states under the 
• 1 Act. Those sections do not obligate the state to fund the 
exercise of the right to "appropriate" treatment; they 
simply require the states to perform certain tasks as a 
condition to receiving federal funds under the Act. ~l~i:J'Ji 
Congress has authority to compel 
a state to fund medical or socially desirable programs. It 
has traditionally exercised authority by imposing conditions 
on the grant of federal assistance. 
' ~~. ' ' ;llji ,;,~,f1,ij;;Ji? 
]j~l~· · ~~ ~i,rl£\!,,~;-, 
2. Is there a private right of action? 
-.~-
'" ,, 
Greg concludes that §6012, that contemplates the 
i) ~I 
creation by the states of a "system to protect and advocate 
the rights of persons with developmental disabilities", read 
in conjunction with the legislative history, makes clear 
that Congress intended a private right of action. Greg alec ' 
concludei that under 1983, as construed in Thiboutot, a 1. 
private right of action against state officials who, acting 
under color of state law, deprive persons of rights secured 
by "the Constitution or law", also confers a private right 
of action. 
'·1. 
' .1 ' ''\• _1 
4. 
3. The appropriate remedies. 
Petitioners do not challenge on this appeal the 
findings of fact by the District Court as to the dreadful 
conditions at Pennhurst. It is therefore evident that 
Pennsylvania has failed to assure that Pennhurst, which 
receives funds from both the state and federal government, 






requirements. Respondents, therefore, are entitled to 
injunctive and declaratory relief. 
.· 4 
! 
Exactly what that relief should be does not seem 
to be clear to Greg, and is not clear to me either at this 
time. I wold prefer, if it is appropriate, to remand for a 
reconsideration of relief in light of our decision as to the 
"rights" conferred by the DD Act. 








In simplest terms, I suppose the District Court 
could simply enjoin the use of public funds at Pennhurst 
until conditions there meet the Act's standards - giving the 
state a reasonable amount of time to comply. 
I also suppose that a holding along the foregoing 
lines would make it unnecessary to reach constitutional 
questions or the contentions as to state law. 
* * * 
5. 
If the DD Act were read to impose affirmative 
funding obligations on a state, independent of the receipt 
of federal funds under the Act, difficult questions would 
arise: '' .. ~, 
Q. Assume, for example, that the DC ordered all 
900 Pennhurst residents to be moved to "community living 
arrangements" but that the only such arrangements available 
will accommodate 300 residents. Would the state have to 
appropriate additional money? If so, would it have to 
appropriate all additional money or would the federal 
government be obligated in some way to assist? 
Q. Assume that the Pennsylvania decided that 
"community living arrangements" were not in accord with the 
best psychiatric thinking, and refuse to appropriate funds 
for such arrangements. Could a federal court find to the 
,. 










MEMO TO FILE 
I record here, for convenience, the more important 
views expressed by Greg in his excellent memo of 12/2/80. 
Pennhurst, with 1200 mentally retarded persons, 
receives both state and federal funds - including Medicaid. 
In this class action suit under §1983, §6010 of the 
Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act 
(the DD Act) and under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, 
the DC found shocking conditions at Pennhurst, and held that 
the treatment or lack of treatment violated the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments and certain other legislative acts, 
but did not consider whether the DD Act was violated. It 
ordered Pennhurst residents be moved to "community living 
arrangments", and that Pennhurst be closed. CA3 generally 
affirmed, but - unlike the DC - also supported extensive 
relief by holding that §6010 of the DD Act (the Bill of 
Rights provision thereof) secures a "right to treatment and 
habilitation" of developmentally disabled persons. 
CA3 also held that a private right of action 
exists under the DD Act, as well as under §1983. CA3 did 
not require, as the DC had, a closing of Pennhurst in 





.• as to the appropriateness of an improved Pennhurst for 
each ••• patient"; and created a "presumption in favor of 
placing individuals in community living arrangements". 
Questions Presented 
1. What rights does the DD Act provide for 
developmentally disabled persons? Section 6010(1) provides: 
"Persons with developmental disabilities have a 
right to appropriate treatment, services, and 
habilitation for such diabilities". 
In view of the foregoing language, petitioners 
concede that this section recognizes a right to treatment, 
but no right to compel a state to fund the exercise of the 
treatment right. Subsection 3 of §6010 provides, in part: 
"The federal government and the states both have 
an obligation to assure that public funds are not 
provided to any institutional or residential 
program" that does not provide appropriate 
treatment and meet prescribed minimum standards. 
Greg concludes (and I agree) that the Act cannot 
fairly be construed to obligate a state, independently of 
the receipt of federal funds, to provide its own funds to 
assure "appropriate" treatment. But Greg thinks the Act 
obligates a state to assure that no public funds (whether 
state or federal) are provided to institutions or programs 
that fail to provide "appropriate treatment" or that fail to 

















Every section of the Act that concerns funding, 
except §6010(3), imposes conditions on the receipt of 
federal funds provided to states. Those sections do not 
obligate the state to fund the exercise of the right to 
"appropriate" treatment; they simply require the states to 
take certain action as a condition to receiving federal 
funds. 
I do not believe Congress has authority to compel 
a state to fund medical or socially desirable programs. It 
has traditionally exercised authority by imposing conditions 
on the grant of federal assistance. 
3. Does DD Act create a presumption in favor of 
"community living arrangements? 
CA3 erred in reading the Act as creating such a 
presumption. 
3. Is there a private right of action? 
Greg concludes that §6012, that contemplates the 
creation by the states of a "system to protect and advocate 
the rights of persons with developmental disabilities", read 
in conjunction with the legislative history, makes clear 
that Congress intended a private right of action. Greg also 
concludes that under 1983, as construed in Thiboutot, a 
., . 
4 . 
private right of action exists against state officials who, 
acting under color of state law, deprive persons of rights 
created by the DD Act. 
tf. The appropriate remedies. 
Petitioners do not challenge on this appeal the 
findings of fact by the District Court as to the dreadful 
conditions at Pennhurst. It is therefore evident that 
Pennsylvania has failed to assure that Pennhurst, which 
receives funds from both the state and federal government, 
provides appropriate treatment and meets the Act's minimum 
requirements. Respondents, therefore, are entitled to 
injunctive and declaratory relief. 
Exactly what that relief should be does not seem 
to be clear to Greg, and is not clear to me either at this 
time. I wold prefer, if it is appropriate, to remand for a 
reconsideration of relief in light of our decision as to the 
"rights" conferred by the DD Act. 
In simplest terms, I suppose the District Court 
could enjoin the use of public funds at Pennhurst until 
conditions there meet the Act's standards - giving the state 
a reasonable amount of time to comply. 
.. , . 
~. 
~· 
,., ,, ' 
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5. 
I also suppose that a holding along the foregoing 
lines would make it unnecessary to reach constitutional 
questions or the contentions as to state law. 
* * * 
If the DD Act were read to impose affirmative 
funding obligations on a state, independent of the receipt 
of federal funds under the Act, difficult questions would 
arise: 
Q. Assume, for example, that the DC ordered all 
1200 Pennhurst residents to be moved to "community living 
arrangements" but that such arrangements available will 
accommodate only 300 residents. would the state have to 
appropriate additional money? If so, would it have to 
appropriate all additional money or would the federal 
government be obligated in some way to assist? 
Q. Assume that the Pennsylvania decided that 
"community living arrangements" were not in accord with the 
best psychiatric thinking, and refused to appropriate funds 
for such arrangements. Could a federal court find to the 
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To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Greg Morgan 
Re: Nos. 79-1414, etc: Pennhurst State School, et al. v. 
Halderman, et al. 
9 
Herewith is an outline to 
l\ 
your thoughts 
for the Conference. You will find one item that we did not 
discuss yesterday: the right-of-action question. 
'~td-o-(~~ <y ~ 
~h,..:l- -.~~~~ 
 
Nos. 79-1414, etc: Pennhurst State School, et al 
v. Halderman, et al. 
This case can be decided along the following lines: 
I. The question before the Court is the construction 
of the DD Act. 
A. CA 3's judgment is based on statutory 
grounds; therefore, the Court need not 
address a claim to a constitutional right to 
treatment. 
B. CA 3 held that § 6010 creates a "right to 
appropriate treatment in the least 
restrictive environment," which states must 
fund. 
C. CA 3 erred, for the language of § 6010 does 
not support theCA 3's construction: 
1. "findings respecting the rights" (§ 
6010(1)) does not create a right. 
2. there is no affirmative funding 
obligation tied to § 6010. 
D. But the Act (§ 6010 (3)) does obligate state 
& federal governments "to assure" that 
"public funds" are not provided to 
institutions which fail either to provide 
appropriate treatment or to meet minimum 
standards. 
1. "public funds" should be read to refer to 
federal funds provided under the DD Act; 
this accords with the traditional reading 
of federal financial-aid statutes. 
2. under this reading of "public funds," the 
DD Act is not a retroactive restriction 
upon federal funds provided under 
Medicaid. 
II. The Court must also decide whether there is a 
private right of action to enforce the Act's obligation. 
A. Maine v. Thiboutot controls: § 1983 
provides the right of action. 
III. Because the CA 3 erred in construing the Act, 
its judgment must be reversed, and the case must be remanded 
for reconsideration, including, if appropriate, the entry of a 
remedial order consistent with this Court's construction of the 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAll! 
No. 79-1404 
Hospital, et al., Petitioners, On vynt of Certiorari to the t:/__, /l kn.t.J~ 
Pennhurst State School and I . . . 
v. U mted States C~urt o_f Ap- · -· '., --1 
T · L H ld t 1 peals for the Third Circmt. /..--1~ ~ .H ~ ,.;,. ~ 1 ern ee a erman e a. ':" ~--~ 
[February -, 1981] ·~ 
HtA_~ 
Memorandum of JusTICE REHNQUIST. {g._  
At issue in this case is the scope and meaning of the De- } 
velopmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of ? I> I!> 10 
1975, 42 U. S. C. § 6000 et seq. The Court of Appeals for ~
the Third Circuit held that the Act created substantive rights _ 1 G 
in favor of the mentally retarded, that those rights were judi-~
cially enforceable; and that conditions at. ~he Pennhurst State  
School and ·Hospital (Pennhurst), a facility for the care and  
treatment of the mentally retarded, violated those rights. 
For the reasons stated below, I would reverse the decision ~ ~ 
of the _Court of Appeals and remand the case for further "--' ~- , 
proceedmgs. • 
~
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania owns and operates
Pennhurst. Pennhurst is a large institution, housing ap-~ S ~ 
proximately 1,200 residents. Seventy-five percent of the resi-
dents are either "severely" or "profoundly" retarded-that ~ -<!-~ ~r 
is, with an IQ of less than 35-and a number of the residents J4, 
are also physically handicapped. About half of its residents 
were committed there by court order and half by a parent or ' 
other guardian. • 
In 1974, respondent Terri Lee Halderman, a minor re-
tarded resident of Pennhurst, filed suit in the District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on behalf of herself 
! 
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and all other Pennhurst residents against Pennhurst, its su-
perintendent, and various officials of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania responsible for the operation of Pennhurst. 
The additional respondents in this case-other mentally 
retarded persons, the United States, and the Pennsylvania 
Association for Retarded Citizens (P ARC)-subsequently 
intervened as plaintiffs. PARC added several surrounding 
counties as defendants, alleging that they were responsible 
for the commitment of persons to Pennhurst. 
As amended in 1975, the complaint alleged inter alia that 
conditions at Pennhurst were unsanitary, inhumane and dan-
gerous. Specifically, the complaint averred that these con-
ditions denied the class members due process and equal pro-
tection of the law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
inflicted on them cruel and unusual punishment in violation 
of the Kghth and Fourteenth Amendments, and denied them 
certain rights conferred by the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 
29 U. S. C. § 794, the Developmentally Di::abled Assistance 
and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. §§ 6001- 6080, and the 
Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 
1966, Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, §§ 4101- 4704. In addition to 
seeking injunctive and monetary relief, the complaint urg:-d 
that Pennhurst be closed and that "community living ar-
rangements" 1 be established for its residents. 
The District Court certifi~d a class consisting of all persons 
who have been or may become residents of Pennhurst. After 
a thirty-two day trial, it issued an opinion, reported at 446 
F. Supp. 1295 (EDPA 1977), making findings of fact and 
conclusions of Jaw with respect to the conditions at Penn-
hurst. Its findings of fact are und:sputed: Conditions at 
Pennhurst are not only dangerous, with the residents often 
physically abused or drugged by staff members, but inade-
1 "Community living arrangements" are smaller , less isolated residences 
where retarded persons are t'(eated as much as possible like nonretarded. 
P.ersot),s_ ._ 
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quate for the "habilitation" of the rt:tarded. 2 Indeed, the 
court found that the physical, intellectual and emotional 
skills of some residents have deteriorated at Pennhurst. !d., 
at 1308- 1310. 
The District Court went on to hold that the mentally re-
tarded have a federal constitutional right to be provided with 
"minimally adequate habilitation" in the "least restrictive 
environment," regardless of whether they were voluntarily or 
involuntarily committed. !d., at 1314-1320. The court also 
held that there existed a constitutional right to "be free from 
harm" under the Eighth Amendment, and to be provided 
with "nondiscriminatory habilitation" under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. !d., at 1320-1322. In addition, it found 
that § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U. S. C. § 794 
and § 201 of the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental 
Retardation Act of 1966, 50 P. S. § 4201, provided a right 
to minimally adequate habilitation in the least restrictive 
environment. 
Each of these rights was found to have been violated by 
the conditions existing at Pennhurst. Indeed, the court held 
that a large institution such as Pennhurst could not provide 
adequate habilitation. !d., at 1318. It thus ordered that 
Pennhurst eventually be closed, that suitable "community 
living arrangements" be provided for all Pennhurst residents, 
that plans for the removal of residents from Pennhurst be 
submitted to the court, that individual treatment plans be 
developed for each resident with the participation of his or 
her family, and that conditions at Pennhurst be improved 
in the interim. The court appointed a Special Master to 
supervise the implementation of this order. I d., at 1326-1329. 
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit substantially 
2 There is a technical difference between "treatment," which applies to 
curable mental illness, and ''habilitation," which consists of education and 
training for those, such as the mentally retarded, who are not ill. This 
memorandum, like the opinions of the courts below, will use the teTIIW 
interchangeably. 
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affirmed the District Court's remedial order. · 612 F. 2d 84 
(CA3 1979) (en bane). Unlike the District Court, however, 
the Court of Appeals sought to avoid the constitutional 
claims raised by respondents and instead rested its order on 
a construction of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance 
and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. § 6000 et seq. 8 It found 
that § 6010 (1) and (2) of the Act, the "bill of rights" pro-
vision, grants to mentally retarded persons a right to "appro-
priate treatment. services, and habilitation" in "the setting 
that is least restrictive of ... personal liberty." "fhe court 
further held that under the test articulated in Cort v. Ash, 
422 U. S. 66, 78 (1975), mentally retarded persons have an 
implied cause of action to enforce that right. ld., at 97. 
Because the Court found that Congress enacted the statute 
pursuant to both § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 4 and 
the Spending Power,5 it declined to consider whether a stat .. 
8 As originally enacted in 1975, the definition of "developmentally dis-
abled" included mental retardation. § 6001 (7) (A) (i). As amended in 
1978, however, a mentally retarded individual i~ considered developmen-
tally disabled only if he satisfies various criteria set forth in the Act. 
It is perhaps suggestive of the novelty of the Court of Appeals' deci-
sion that none of the respondents briefed the Act before the District 
Court, nor raised it in the Court of Appeals. Rather, the court itself sug-
gested the applicability of the Act and requested supplemental briefs on 
the issue for purpose of rehearing en bane. Even then the United States, 
which raised only constitutional claims before the District Court, con-
tended merely that the "rn~t, significant implication of the Developmen-
tally Disabled Act is the important light which it sheds upon congres:>ional 
intent about the nature of the rights of institutionalized mentally retarded 
persons, and the guidance which it may give in discerning a violation of 
Section 504 [of the Rehabilitation Act]." Supplementitl Brief of the 
United States (below) at 2. 
4 Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that "The Congress 
shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of 
this article." 
5 The Spending Power is encompassed in Art.. I, § 8, cl. 1 of the Con-
stitution which states the "Congress shall have the Power To •.. pr<Wide-
for the •.. general Welfare of the United States.'' 
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ute enacted pursuant to the Spending Power alone "could 
ever provide the predicate for private substantive rights." 
ld., at 98. As an alternative ground, the court affirmed the 
District Court's holding that Pennhurst residents have a state 
statutory right to adequate "habilitation." 
The court concluded that the conditions at Pennhurst vio-
lated these federal and state statutory rights. As to relief, 
it affirmed the order of the District Court except insofar as it 
ordered Pennhurst to be closed. Although the court con-
cluded that "deinstitutionalization is the favored approach to 
habilitation" in the least restrictive environment, it did not 
construe the Act to require the closing of large institutions 
like Pennhurst. /d., at 115. The court thus remanded the 
case to the District Court for "individual determinations by 
the court, or by the Special Master, as to the appropriateness 
of an improved Pennhurst for each patient" and instructed 
the District Court or the Master to "engage in a presumption 
in favor of placing individuals in [community living arrange-
ments.]" ld., at 114-115.8 
Three judges dissented. Although they assumed that the 
majority was correct in holding that Pennhurst residents have 
a r}ght to treatment under the Act and an implied cause of 
action under the Act to enforce that right, they disagreed 
that the Act imposed a duty on the defendants to provide 
the "least restrictive treatment" possible. The dissent stated 
that 11the language and structure of the Act, the relevant 
regulations, the legislative history all indicate that the States 
may consider their own resources in providing less restrictive 
treatment/' !d., at 119. It did not believe that the general 
4 The decisions below a.re somewhat unclear as to whom petitioners owe 
this right of treatment. The District Court certified a class of all persons 
who may become residents of Pennhurst and the Court of Appeals di-
rected relief for all plaintiffs in the case, including those on Pennhurst's 
waiting list. Thus, the decisions arguably entitle even those mentally 
retarded citizens who are not institutionalized or currently receiving 
services to a 1'right to trea.tOlent," 
79-1404-MEMO 
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findings and declarations contained in a funding statute d~­
~igned to encourage a course of conduct could be used by th.e 
federal courts to create absolute obligations on the States.7 
We granted certiorari to consider petitioners' several chal-
lenges to the decision below. Petitioners first contend that 
§ 6010 of the Act does not create in favor of the mentally re, 
tarded any substantive rights to "appropriate treatment" 'in 
the "least restrictive" environment. Assu!ning that Congress 
pid intend to create such a right, petitioners question the au-
thot:ity of Congress to impose these affirmative obiigat!ons on 
the States under either its Spending Power or § 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Petitioners next assert that any rights 
pr.eated by the Act are enforceabie in federal court only by 
the Federal government, not by ,Private parties. Finally, 
petitioners argue that the court below read the scope of any 
rights created by the Act too broadly and far exceeded its 
remedial po"'ers in re~uiring the Commonwe!ilth to move its 
residents to less r~strictive environ~E_lnts and creat!) individ-
ual habilitation plans ,for the mentally retarde9. . ~ecause. I 
~gree with petitioners' J!rst co~on-that § 6010 simJ?1Y 
does not create substantive rights-! find it unnecessary to 
ad<lress the remaining issues . . , • 
II 
I turn first to .a brief review of the general structure of the 
Act. It is a federal-st!tte "grant program whereby the Fed-
eral Government provides financial assistance to participating 
' 
7 The dissent went on to conclude that neither the Federal Constitution, 
§ 504 of the_ .R$abilitahqn Act of 197?, ,nor state Jaw, requjred. a State 
to provide treatment-. in the "least restrictive setting." The 4isseat would 
have thus reversed those portions of the Distri~t Court.'s order that con-
templated a court order closing Pcnnhurst a11d the {!reation of new less 
restrictive facilities. It would also have remanded the case to the Dis~ 
trict Court for it to decide "how best to bring Pennhurst in compliance 
with statutory and constitutional requirements" and left open "the possi-
bility that certain individuals in the future may. .be able to show that tqr,ir 
parti~ular 111ode of treatment is not ration.ally related to the State1s pil¥-
pose m confining them." 612 F. 2d, at 131. 
; " 
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States to aid them in creating programs to care for and treat 
the developmentally disabled. Like other federal-state coop-
erative_prog_rams, the Act is voluntary and the States are 
given the choice of complying with the conditions set forth 
in the Act or foregoing the benefits of federal funding. See 
generally King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309 (1968); Rosado v. 
Wyman, 397 U. S. 397 (1970), Harris v. McRae, - U. S. 
- (1980). The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has elected 
to yarticip~te in the program. The Secretary of Health and 
Human Services, the agency responsible for administering the 
Act, has approved Pennsylvania's state plan and in 1976 dis-
bursed to Pennsylvania approximately $1.6 million. Penn-
hurst itself receives no federal funds under the Act, though 
it does receive approximately $6 million per year in Medicaid 
funds. 
The Act begins with an exhaustive statement of purposes . ....... 
42 U. S. C. § 6000 (b)( 1). The "overall puryose" of the 
Act, as amended in 1978, is: 
"To assist the states to ensure that persons with de-
velopmental disabilities receive the care, treatment, and 
other services necessary to enable them to achieve their 
maximum potentia] through a system which coordinates, 
monitors, and plans and evaluates those services and 
which ensures the protection of the legal and human 
rights of persons with developmental disabilities." (Em-
phasis supplied.) 
As set forth in the margin, the "specific purposes" of the Act 
are to "assist" and financially "support" various activities 
necessary to the provision of comprehensive services to the 
developmentally disabled. § 6000 (b)(2).8 
8 Section 6000 (b) (2) provides 
"The specific purposes of this chapter are-
"(A) to assist in the provision of comprehensive services to persons with 
developmental disabilities, with priority to those persons whose needs can-
not be coveTed or otherwise met unqer the Education for All Handicappe~ 
79--1404-MEMO 
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The Act next lists a variety of conditions for the receipt 
of federal funds. Under § 6005, for example, tlie Secretary 
"'"as a condition of providing assistance" shall require that 
"each recipient of such assistance take affirmative action" to 
hire qualified handicapped individuals. Each State, in turn, 
shall "as a condition" of receiving assistance submit to the 
Secretary a plan to evaluate the services provided under the 
Act. § 6009. Each State shall also "as a condition" of re-
ceiving assistance "provide the Secretary satisfactory assur-
ances that each program . . . which receives funds from the 
State's allotment ... has in effect for each developmentally 
disabled person who receives services from or under the pro-
gram a habilitation plan." § 6011. And § 6012 conditions 
aid on a state's promise to "have in effect a system to pro-
tect and advocate the rights of persons with developmental 
disabilities." 
At issue here, of course, is § 6010, the "bill of rights" provi-
sion. It states in relevant part that: 
Congress makes the following findings respecting the 
rights of persons with developmental disabilities: 
(1) Persons with developmental disabilities have a 
right to appropriate treatment, services, and habilitation 
for such disabilities. 
Children Act, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ... , or other health, educa-
tion, or welfare programs ; 
"(B) to assist States in appropriate planning activities; 
"(C) to make grants to States and public and private, nonprofit agen-
cies to establish model programs, to <femonstrate innovative habilitation 
techniques, and to train professional and paraprofessional personnel with 
respect to providing services to persons with developmental disabilities; 
"(D) to make grants to university affiliated' facilities to assist them in 
administering and operating demonstration facilities for the provision of 
services to persons with developmental disabilities, and interdisciplhary 
training programs for personnel needed to provide specialized services for· 
those persons; and 
"(E) to make grants to support a system in each State to protect the· 
legal' andl humnn tiglit.s of all persons with developmental disabilities.'r 
-
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(2) The treatment, services, and habilitation for a 
person with developmental disabilities should be designed 
to maximize the developmental potential of the person 
and should be provided in the setting that is least restric-
tive of the person's liberty. 
(3) The Federal GQ;'rernment and the States both have 
an obligation to assure that public funds . areliOt p~­
vided to any institution ... that (A) does not provide 
treatment, services, and habilitation which are not ap-
propriate to the needs of such person; or (B) does not 
meet the following minimum standards .... 
Noticeably absent from § 6010 is any language suggesting 
that § 6010 is a "condition" for the receipt of federal funding 
under the Act. Section 6010 thus stands in sharp contrast to 
§§ 6005, 6009, 6011 and 6012. 
The enabling parts of the Act are the funding sections. 42 
U. S. C. §§ 6060-6063.9 Those sections describe how funds 
are to be allotted to the States, require that any State desir-
ing financial assistance must submit an overa:ll plan satisfac-
tory to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and 
require that funds disbursed under the Act be used in accord-
ance with the approved state plan. To be approved by the 
Secretary, the state plan must comply fl.h several specific 
conditions set forth in § 6063. The plam inter alia must pro-
vide for the establishment of a State Plannit1g Council, § 6063 
(b)( 1), and set out specific objectives to be achieved under 
the plan,§ 6063 (b)(2)(A). 'l'he plan requires that services 
furnished under the plan be consistent with standards pre-
scribed by the Secretary, § 6063 (b)(5)(A)(i), and be pro-
vided in an individual manner consistent with § 6011, § 6063 
(b)(5)(B). The plan must also be supported by assurances 
that any program receiving assistance is protecting the human 
9 Sections 6031-6043 authorize separate funding to university-affiliated 
facilities for the operation of demonstration and training programs anti .are 
not pertinent here. 
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rights of the disabled consistent with § 6010, § 6063 (b) (5) 
(C).10 Each State must also require its State Planning Coun-
cil to serve as an advocate of persons with developmental dis-
abilities. § 6067. 
The Act further provides procedures and sanctions to en-
sure state compliance with its requirements. The Secretary 
may, of course, disapprove a state plan, § 6063 (c). If a 
State fails to satisfy the requirements of § 6063, the Secre-
tary may termina.te or reduce the federal grant. § 6065. Any 
State dissatisfied with the Secretary's disapproval of the plan, 
or his decision to terminate funding, may appeal to the fed-
eral courts of appeals. § 6068. No other cause of action is 
recognized in the Act. 
III 
As support for its broad remedial order, the Court of Ap- C ,4- 3 
peals found that § 6010 of the Act created substantive rights 
in favor of the disabled and imposed an obligation on the 
States to provide, at their own expense, certain kinds of 
treatment. The initial question before us, then, is one of 
statutory construction: Did Congress intend in § 6010 to 
create enforceable rights and obligations? 
A 
In discerning congressional intent, we necessarily turn to 
the possible sources of Congress' power to legislate, namely, 
CongreSs' power to enforce tne F'ourteeiith Amendment and 
its power under the Spending Cl~use to ~~nditions~n 
the grant of federal funds. AUiiough tlie court below held 
that Congress actea under both powers, the respondents 
themselves disagree on this point. The Halderman respond-
ents argue that § 6010 was enacted pursuant to § 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, they assert that 
10 The provisions of § 6063 were reworded and recodified in 1978. Sec-
tion 6063 (b) (5) (C) replaced § 6063 (b) (24) of the 197.5 Act, which 'teJ.-
q_uired a somewhat similar "a~\l.l':aM~.1 ' 
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§ 6010 is mandatory on the States, regardless of their receipt 
of federal funds. The Solicitor General, in contrast, concedes 
that Congress acted pursuant to its Spending PoweraiO'iie. 
Tr. of Oral Arg., at 54. Thus, in his'";riew, § 6010 only ap-
plies to those States which accept federal funds.11 
Although this Court has previously addressed issues going 
to Congress' power to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641, 651 
(1966); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); Fitzpatrick 
v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1975)/2 we have had little occasion to 
consider the appropriate test for determining when Congress 
intends to enforce those guarantees. In my view, because 
such legislation imposes congressional policy on a State in-
voluntarily, and because it often intrudes on traditional stat~ 
authority, we should not guickiy attribute to Congress an 
•H unstated intentr'to act under its authority to enforce the Four-
teenth Amendment. In our previous cases Congress exp~essly ===-___...._. 
11 The PARC respondents take a somewhat different view. Although 
they argue that Congress enacted § 6010 under both § 5 and the Spending 
Power, they suggest that § 6010 applies only to programs which receive 
federal money. The PARC respondents are aiso cross petitioners in this 
case, arguing that the Act requires Pennhurst to be closed. In their view, 
the individual placement. decisions required by the court below are not 
authorized by the Act and, in any event, are a.n improper exercise of 
judicial authority. 
12 There is of course a question whether Congress would ha.ve the power 
to create the rights and obligations found by the court below. Although 
the court held that "section 6010 does not go beyond what has been judi-
cially decleared to be the limits of the Fourteenth Amendment," 612 F. 
2d at 98, this Court has never found that the civilly committed have a 
constitutional "right to treatment," much Jess the voluntarily committed. 
See Sanchez v. New Mexico, 396 U. S. 276 (1970), dismissing for want of 
substantial federal question, 80 N . Mex. 438, 457 P. 2d 370 (1968); 
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S. 563, 587-589 (1975) (BuRGER, C. J., 
concurring). Thus, petitioners and several amici argue that legislation 
which purports to create against the Sta.tes not only a right to treatment, 
but one in the least restrictive setting, is not "appropriate" legislation 
within the meaning of § 5. Because I would conclude that § 6010 creates 
no rights wi1atsoever, I find it unnecc,;sary to consider tha.t quest.iiin~ 
19-1404-MEMO 
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articulated its intent to legislate pursuant to § 5. See Kat-
zenbach v. Morgan, supra, (intent expressly stated in the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965); Oregon v. Mitchell, supra, (intent 
expressly stated in the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 
1970); Fitzpatrick v. B-itzer, supra, (intent expressly stated 
in both the House and Senate Reports of the 1972 Amend-
ments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964); cf. South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach, 301 U. S. 383 (1966) (intent to enforce the 
Fifteenth Amendment expressly stated in the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965). Those cases, moreover, involved statutes 
which simply prohibited certain kinds of state conduct. The 
case for inferring intent is at its weakest wher~ as here. the 
rights asserted impose affirmative obligations on the States to 
fund certain services, since we may assume that Congress will 
not implicitly attempt to impose massive financial obliga-
tions on the States. 
Turning to Congress' power to legislate pursuant to the 
Spending Power, our cases have long recognized that Con-
gress may nx the terms on which it shall disburse federal 
money to the States. See, e. g., Oklahoma v. Civil Service 
Commission, 330 U. S. 127 (1947); King v. Smith, supra, 
Rosado v. Wyman, supra. Unlike legislation enacted under 
§ 5, however, legislation enacted pursuant to the Spending 
Power is much in the nature of a contract: in return for fed-
eral funds, the States agree to comply with federally imposed 
conditions. The legitimacy of Congress' power to legislate 
under the Spending Power thus rests on whether the State 
voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the "contract". 
See Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 548, 585-598 
(1937); Harris v. McRae, supra. There can, of course, be no 
knowing acceptance if a State is unaware of the conditions or· 
is unable to ascertain what is expected of it. Accordingly, if 
CopgreE:s intends to impose a condition on the grant of fede~ 
moneys, it must dQ.....§.O unambigU<1JJ.slY.13 Cf. Employees v~ 
13 There are limits on the power of Congre;;s to impose conditions on the· 
Stat~s J;>Ursuant to, its Spending Power, Stewart Machine Co . v. DaviS,. 
.. 
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Department of Public Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 285 
(1973); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1978). By insist-
ing that Congress speak with a clear voice, we enable the 
States to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the 
consequences of their participation. 
Indeed, in those instances where Congress has intended the 
States to fund certain entitlements as a condition of receiving 
federal funds, it has proved capable of saying so explicitly. 
See, e. g., King v. Smith, supra, at 333 (Social Security Act 
creates a "federally imposed obligation [on the states] to fur-
nish 'aid to families with dependent children' ... with reason:-
able promptness to all eligible individuals" quoting the Act). 
We must carefully inquire, then, whether Congress in § 6010 
irp.posed an 
1
66hgabon'On the States to spend state money to 
fund certain rights as a (;;llaition of receiving federal moneys 
under the Act or whether it spoke merely in precatory terms. 
B 
Applying those principles to this case, I find nothing in the 
Act or its legislative history to suggest that Congress intended 
to require the States to assume the high cost of providing 
"appropriate treatment" in the "least restrictive environ-
ment" to their mentally retarded citizens. 
There is virtually no support for the lower court's conclu-
sion that Congress created rights and obhgatwns pursuant to 
its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. The Act 
nowhere states that that is its purpose. Quite the ~ontrary, 
the Act's language and structure demonstrate that it is a 
mere federal-state funding statute. The explicit purposes of 
supra, at 585; Lau v. Nichols, 414 U. S. 563, 569 (1974); Fullilove v. 
Klutznick,- U. S. - (1980) (BURGER, C. J.) ; See National Leag·ue of 
Cities v. Usery , 420 U. S. 833 (1976) . Even the Halderman re::;pondent~, 
like the court below, recognize the "con~titutional tUiiculties" with im-
posing affirmative obligation::; on the States pursuant to the Spending 
Power, Tr. of Oral Arg., at 45 . That i;;1me, howev~r, i:; not now before us, 
' ~ 
c::z,_ I""U-'~ ~ "-.,... • 
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the Act are simply "to assist" the States through the use of 
federal grants to improve the care and treatment of the 
mentally retarded. § 6000 (b). Nothing in either the "over-
all" or "specific" purposes of the Act reveals an intent to 
require the States to fund new, substantive rights. Surely 
Congress would not have established such elaborate funding 
incentives had it simply intended to impose absolute obliga-
tions on the States. 
Respondents nonetheless insist that the fact that ~ 6010 
speaks in terms of "rights" supports their view. I find their 
reliance misplaced. "In expounding a statute, we must not 
be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but 
look to the provisions of the whole law. and to its object and 
policy." Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U. S. 707. 713 (1975), 
quoting United States v. Heirs of Boisdore, 8 How. 113, 122 
(1849). See District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U. S. 418, 
420 (1973). Contrary to respondents' assertion, the specific 
purpose of § 6010 is cloudy. Not only is its language am-
biguous, but it evolved from iegislative compromise. leaving 
little in the way of legislative history. I am persuaded that 
§ 6010, when read in the context of other more specific pro-
v~s ofthe Act, does no more than express a congressional 
preference for certain kinds of treatment. It is sin1ply a gen-
eral statement of 7 'findings" and, as such, is too thin a reed 
to support the rights and obligations read into it by the court 
below. I think that the ciosest one can come in giving § 6010 
meaning is to say that it was to justify and support Congress' 
appropriation of money under the Act and guide the Secre-
tary in his review of state appiications for federal funds. 
See United States v. Carolene P~oducts, 304 tT. S. 144, 152 
(1938).H As this Court recognized in Rosado v. Wyman, 397 
14 Respondents also contend that the title of the Act as passed, rather 
than as codified, reveals an intent to create rights in favor of the dis-
abled. Pub. L. 94-103, 89 Stat. 486 (1975). As passed, the Act contained 
three Titles. Title I provided for services and facilities to the developmen-
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U. S. 397, 413 (1970), "Congress sometimes legislates by 
innuendo, making declarations of policy and indicating a pref-
erence while requiring measures that, though falling short of 
legislating its goals, serve as a nudge in the preferred direc-
tions." I think this is such a case. 
The legislative history buttresses my view that Congress 
intended to encourage, rather than mandate, 'the provision of 
better services to the developmentally disabled. The House 
Committee viewed the Act simply as a "catalyst" to promote 
"effective planning by the states of their programs, initiation 
of new, needed programs, and filling of gaps among existing 
efforts." H. R. Rep. No. 58, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 6, 21 
(1975). Indeed, as passed by the House, the Act contained 
no "bill of rights" provision whatsoever. The Committee in-
stead merely "applauded" the efforts of others to secure rights 
for the developmentally disabled. ld., at 7. 
Respondents, however, argue vigorously that the legislative 
history of the bill as passed by the Senate evinces Con-
gress' intent to impose absolute obligations on the states to 
fund certain levels of treatment. ~espondents rely rpost 
heavily on Title II of the Senate bill which adopted a "Bill 
~ -of Rights" for the mentally retarded and contained over 400 
pages of aetaiteer standards "designed to assist in the protec-
tion of the human rights guaranteed under the Constitution." 
S. Rep. No. 160, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1975). The Re-
the Rights of Persons with Developmental Dit>abilities," contained § 6010. 
Respondents' reliance on this title is in my view mlliplaced. It has long 
been establi:shed that the title of an Act. "cannot enlarge or confer 
powers." United States v. Oregon Railroad, 164 U. S. 526, 541 (1896); 
Cornell v. Coyne, 192 U. S. 418, 430 (1904). See Unitecl States v. Fisher, 
2 Cr. 358, 386 (1805); Yazoo & Mississippi Railroad v. Thornas, 132 U.S. 
174, 188 (1889) . In addition, the location of§ 6010 in the Act as passed 
confirms § 6010'~ limited meaning. Section 6010 was the preface of Title 
II followed by provisiom;; later eodified as §§ 6009, 6011, 6012. The con-
gressional findings in § 6010 thus seem to have been det>igned simply to 
serve as the rationale for the conditions imposed in the remaining sections 
of Title II. 
T~~zr 
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port also noted that the "Federal Government has a respon-
sibility to provide equal protection under the law to all 
citizens." Id., at 32. And Senator Stafford stated on the 
Senate floor that "Title II was added to the bill to assist in 
the protection of the rights guaranteed under our Constitu-
tion for those individuals that will require institutionaliza-
tion." 121 Cong. Rec. 16516 (1975). 
Respondents read too much into these scattered bits of 
legislative history. In the first place, it is by no means clear r 
that even the Senate bill created new substantive rights in 
favor of the disabled.15 Despite the general discussion of 
equal protection guarantees in the Senate Report. the Com-
mittee's view of the Act was i!i);Qpl~r quite modest. It ex-
plained that the purpose of Title II was "to stimulate the 
States to develop alternative programs of care for the men-
tally retarded." S. Rep. No. 94-160, supra, at 1. It is 
apparent that Committee adopted Title II because it "be-
lieve [ d] that there is a need for a clear exposition of the 
purposes for which support should be provided under the 
Act." /d., at 3. Thus the purpose of Title II was simply to 
guide the administration of the Act. Nor are the remarks 
of various Senators to the contrary€> Senator Stafford spoke 
merely in terms of "assisting" the States. Senator Randolph, 
in introducing the bill on the floor of the Senate, confirmed 
the-senate's limited purpose. He said that 
"We have developed a bill whose thrust, like the 1970 
Act, is to {iiS;ist~ates in developing a comprehensive 
plan to br~gether available resources in a coordi-
u As originally passed by the Senate, for example, the bill provided that 
a State which failed to comply with the qetailed standards of care enumer-
ated in Title II would lose all federal funding, including that provided 
under such programs as Medicaid. S. 462, Tit. II, § 206. S. Rep. No. 
160, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1975). The fact that- the Senate would 
include a funding sanction is, of course, wholly inconsistent with respond- · 
ents' argument that Congress was acting pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteentht 
Amendme.nt •. 
--
, . . . 
' 
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nated way so developmentally disabled individuals are 
appropriately served. Our goal is more thorough and 
careful planning and more effective evaluation." 121 
Cong. Rec. 16514 (1975) (emphasis supplied). 
Even Senator Javits, the principal proponent of Title II, did 
not read the Act as establishing new substantive rights to en-
force those guaranteed by the Constitution. He explained 
that Title II "represents a reaffirmation of the basiCliUiilan 
and civil rights of all citizens. HI offers the direction to pro-
vide a valill and realistic framework for improving the overall 
situation of this country's mentally retarded and other de-
velopmentally disabled individuals." ld., at 16519 (emphasis 
supplied). 
In any event, whatever the Senate's view of its bill, Con-
gress declined to Mlopt it. TKe'""Conference Committee re-
ject"eo the eii)Iicit stand;;ds of Title II and instead com-
promised on the more general statement of "findings" in what 
later became § 6010. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 473, 94th Cong., 
1st Sess., 41, 43 (1975). As Senator Javits noted with re-
spect to the compromise, "Title II of the Conference agree-
ment establishes a clear federal policy that the mentally 
retarded have a right to appropriate treatment, services, 
and habilitation." 121 Cong. Rec. 29820 (1975) (emphasis 
supplied). 
In sum, nothing suggests that Congress intended the Act 
to be something other than a typical funding statute.16 Far 
16 Nor is the contrary proved by a 1978 amendment to § 6010 which 
provides: 
"The rights o£ person with developmental disabilities described in findings 
made in this section are in addition to any constitutional or other rights 
otherwise afforded to all persons." 
This provision, adopted in Conference Committee without any legislative 
history, merely expresses Congress' view that persons with developmental 
disabilities have rights in addition to those generally available to "all per-
sonst· The .section recogni:~~es that Congress only "described" rights, ;noi 
¥9-1404-MEMO 
18 PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL v. HALDERMAN 
from requiring the States to fund newly declared individual 
rights, the Act has a systematic focus, seeking to improve 
care to individuals by encouraging better state planning, 
coordination and demonstration projects. Much like the 
Medicaid statute considered in Harris v. McRae, - U. S. 
- ( 1980), the Act at issue here "was designed as a coop-
erative program of shared responsibilities, not as a device for 
the Federal Government to compel a State to provide services 
that Congress itself is unwilling to fund." 
There remains the contention of the Solicitor General that 
Congress, acting pursuant to its Spending Power, conditioned 
th~ grant of federal money on tlie State's agreeing to under-
write the obligations the Court of Appeals read into § 6010.11 
I find that C~I]tention wholl;r, without merit. As amply dem-
onstrated above, tfie """l''findings" ins 6010, when viewed in the 
context of the more specific provisions of the Act, represent 
general statements of federal policy, not newly created legal 
duties. ~ S 6- 6' 
The "plain language" of § 6010 also refutes the Solicitor 
General's ~ontenhon. Wnen Congress intended to imnose ~ ~~-In 
conditions orit negrant of federal funds, as in§§ 6005, 6009, 
6011, 6012, 6063, and 6067, it proved capable of doing so " ~ 
in clear terms. Section 6010, in marked contrast, in no way f/J/.L. _ ~. , /.&J .... _. 
suggests that the grant of federal funds is "conditioned"!~~~ 
on a state funding the rights described therein. In my view, 
the existence of explicit conditions throughout the Act, and 
the absence of conditional ianguage in § 6010, manifest the 
limited meaning of § 6010. 
Equally telling is the fact that the Secretary has spe..Q.ifical!y 
rejected the position of the So · · o G nera . The purpose 
of t e ct, according to the Secretary, is mereiy "to imorove 
and coordinate the provision of services to pPr~ons wit'!, dP-
velopmental disabilities.'' 45 C. F. R. § 1385.1 (1979). The· 
created them. Nothing in the language supports an inference of substa'no. 
tive d.\l.ties from a stateil}.ent of c'onY!ressiona) policy. 
'. 
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Secretary acknowledges that "No authority was included in 
[the 1975] Act to allow the Department to withhold funds 
from States on the basis of failure to meet the findings [of 
§ 6010]. 45 Fed. Reg. 31,006 (May 9, 1980). If funds can-
not be terminated for a state's failure to comply with § 6010, 
§ 6010 can hardly be considered a "condition" of the grant of 
federal funds17 
The legislative history of the Act confirms the Secretary's 
conclusion. In reaching the compromise on § 6010, the Con-
ference Committee rejected the Senate's proposal to termi-
nate federal funding of States which failed to comply with 
the standards enumerated in Title II of the Senate's bill, see 
n. 15, supra. By eliminating that sanction, CongTess made 
clear that the provisions of § 6010 were intended to be bora-
tory, not mandatory.18 
17 To be sure, the Secretary has read the 1978 recodification of § 6063 
(b) (5) (C) to require a participating State to assure the Secretary that 
servir.es in fund 2d programs are being provided consistent with § 6010. 
45 Fed. Rrg. 31,006. But, as will be discussed supra, a participating 
state's obligations under·§ 6063 (b) (5) (C) are far more modest thlm the 
obligations read into ·§ 6010 by the court" below and urged· by the Solicitor 
General here. It is also important to note that the Secretary, despite his 
apparent authority to do so, has not terminated funds to Pennsylvania 
for noncC'mpliance with § 6063 (b) ( 5) (C). 
18 The Solicitor General also relies heavily on § 6010 (3), quoted supra, 
at 9. He apparently contends that Congress in § 6010 (3) conditioned 
the grant of all federal ftmds, including Medicaid, on the participating 
State's agreement to provide adequate treatment to individuals. Although 
§ 6010 (3), unlike§§ 6010 (1) and (2), at least speaks in terms of "obliga-
tions," I find the Solicitor General's ar~tument ultimately without merit. 
First, like the other "findings" in § 6010, § 6010 (3) is merely an expression 
of federal policy. As even the Secretary concede;;, Congre:>S did not give 
the Secretary authority to withdraw federal funds on the basis of a state'::; 
failure to comply with § 6010 (3). Second, by its terms, § 6010 (3) states 
that both the Federal Government and the States should not spend 
public money for substandard in-stitutions. Nothing reveals an intent to 
condition the grant of federal funqs under the Act on · the state's promise 
·to ·provide appropriate habilitation ' to individuals. 
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My conclusion is also buttressed by tlw rule o · statutory 
construction pos1 e a ove, t at .-ongress must express 
clearly 1ts intent to impose conditions on the grant of federal 
funds so that the States can knowingly decide whether or 
not to accept those funds. That canon applies with greatest 
force where, as here, a State's potential obligations under the 
Act are largely indeterminate. It is difficult to know what 
is meant by providing "appropriate treatment" in the "least 
restrictive" setting and I find it unlikely that a State would 
have accepted federal funds had it known it would be bound 
to provide such treatment. The crucial inquiry. however. is 
not whether a State would knowingly undertake that obliga-
tion, but whether Congress spoke so ch>arly that we can fairly 
say that thr- State could make an informed choice. In this 
case. Congwss fell well short of providing unambiguous notice 
to the States that they, by accepting funds under the Act, 
would indeed be obligated to comply with ~ 6010. The fact 
that Congress allotted to Pennsylvania only $1.6 million in 
1976, a sum woefully inadequate to meet the enormous finan-
cial burden of providing "appropriate" treatment in the 
"least restrictive" setting, confirms that Congress must have 
had a limited purpose in enacting § 6010. When Congress 
does impose affirmative obligations on the States, it usually 
makes a far more substantial contributiou to defray costs. 
Harr'is v. McRae,- F. S. - (1980). It defie~ common 
sem:e, in short, to ~uppose that Congress implicitly imposed 
this massive obligation on participating States. 
Finally, a brief comparison of the general language of 
§ 6010 with the conditions Congress explicitly imposed on the 
States demonstrates that Congress did not intend to place 
either absolute or conditional obligations on the States. The 
Court of Appeals, for example, read § 6010 to impose an 
obligation to provide habilitation plans for all developmen-· 
tally disabled persons. But Congress required habilitation 
plans under § 6011 "only when the Federal assistance under 
the Act contl:i.butes a portion of the cost of the habiiita..;.. 
' I 
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tion services to the developmentally disabled person.'' H. R. 
Conf. Rep. No. 94--473, supra, at 43. If the Court of Appeals 
were correct, of course, there would be no purpose for Con-
gress to have required habilitation pians at all, or to have 
limited the requirement to .certain progra~s, since such plans 
automatically would have been mandated in all programs by 
the more inclusive requirements of § 6010. 
Second, the specific condition imposed in§ 6063 (b)(5)(C) 
requires each state plan to: 
"contain or be supported by assurances satisfactory to 
the Secretary . th.at ~he human rights of all persons with 
developmental disabilities ... who are receiving treat-
ment, services, or habii~ta.tion, u~der programs assisted 
under this chapter will be protected consistent with 
§ 6010 of this Titie (reiating to rights of the developmen-
tally disabled). 
t 
Once again; these limitations--both as to programs assisted 
. ).mder the Act and as to affording .Protection in a manner that 
is "consistent wi~h § 6010"-would be unnecessary if, as the 
court below ruled, all state programs were required to fund 
1 • 
the rights described in § 6010. . 
And third, the court below held that § 6010 mandated de-
institutionalization for most., if not ~11, mentally retarded per-
sons. As originally enacted in 1975 .. however, the Act re-
. quired only that each State use not less than 30 percent of 
its allotment, "for the purpose of assisting in developing 
and implementing plans designed to eliminate inappropriate 
placement in institutions o{ persons with developmental dis-
abilities." § 6062 (a)(4).20 Three years later, Congress re-
lieved the States of even that modest duty. Instead of re-
20 The House Report, for example, explained that States were required 
only to plan "for as much deinstitutionalization as is feasible," recognizing 
that this requirement would "prompt some movement of patients from 
State institutions back into their communities!' H. R. Rep. No·. 58; ~4th 
' Cong., tst Sess., 10 (1975), 
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quiring the States to use a certain portion of their allotment 
to support deinstitutionalization, Congress required the States 
to concentrate their efforts in at least one of four areas, only 
one of which was ucommunity living arrangements." § 6063 
(b)( 4)(A)(ii). Had § 6010 created a right to deinstitution-
alization, the policy choices contemplated by both the 1975 
and 1978 provisions would be meaningless. 
In sum, the court below failed to recognize the well-settled 
distinction between Congressional uencouragement" of state 
programs and the imposition of binding obligations on the 
States. Harris v. McRae,- U.S.- (1980). Relying on 
that distinction, this Court in Southeastern Community Col-
lege v. Davis, 442 U. S. 397 (1979), rejected a claim that 
§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which bars discrimi~ 
nation against handicapped persons in federally funded pro-
grams, obligates schools to take affirmative steps to eliminate 
problems raised by an applicant's hearing disability. Finding 
that "state agencies such as Southeastern are only 'encour-
aged' ... to adopt such policies and procedures,'" /d., at 410 
(quoting the Act), we stressed that 11C:ongress understood that 
accommodation of the needs of handicapped individuals may 
require affirmative action and knew how to provide for it in 
those instances where it wished to do so." !d., at 411. Like~ 
wise in this case, Congress was aware of the need of develop~ 
mentally disabled persons and plainly understood the differ-
ence, financial and otherwise, between encouraging a specified 
type of treatment and mandating it. 
IV 
Respondents also suggest that they may bring suit to com-
pel compliance with those conditions which are contained in 
the Act. Of particular relevance to this case are § 6011 and 
§ 6063 (b)(5)(C) , which are quoted supra, at-. 
That claim raises several issues. First, it .. must be deter-
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to compel state compliance with those conditions.21 In legis-
lation enacted pursuant to the Spending Power, the typical 
remedy for state noncompliance with federally imposed con-
ditions is not a private cause of action for noncompliance but 
r.ather action by the Federai Government to terminate funds 
to the State. Justiast term, however, in Maine v. Thiboutot, 
-U.S.- (1980), we heid that 42 U.S. C.§ 1983 provides 
a cause of action for "state deprivations of any right ... 
~ecured by aii iaws [of the United States]." Whether Thi-
boutot controls this case depends on two factors. First, re-
spondents here, unlike the piaintiff in Thiboutot who alleged 
that state law prevented him from receiving feclerai funds to 
which he was e~titieci, can oniy ciaim that t~e state pian has 
not provided adequate "assurances" to the . Secre~ary. It is 
at least an open question whether an individual's interest 
in having a St.ate provide _those -"~ssurances" is a "right se-
cured" by the laws qf the United States .within . the~ meanin~ 
of § 1983. Second. JusTICE PowELL in dissent in Thibotout 
. ~ ·· suggested that § 1983 would n<;>t be availaqle where the "gov-
erning statute provides an exclusiv~ remedy for violations of 
the Act." !d., at -. It is unclear whether the express 
remedy contained in this Act, § 6o65, is exclusive. . 
Second. it is not at all clear that respondents have vio-
lated§ 6011 and§ 6063 (b)(5)(C). Those sections, by their 
terms, only refer to "programs assisted" under the Act. Be-
cause Pennhurst does not receive federal funds under the 
Act, it is ara:uably not a "program assisted." Thus, there 
may be no obligation on the State under § 6011 to assnre the 
Secretary that each resident of Pennhurst have a habilitation 
plan, or assure the Secretary under § 6063 (b)(5)(C) that 
Pennhurst residents are being provided services consistent 
with § 6010. 
21 Because I conclude that § 6010 confers no substantive rights, I need 
not reach the question whether there is a private cause of action under 
that section or under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 to enforce those rights. See 
So'klf!elu!tem Community College v. Davis, 442 U. S. ·39ii\ 404 n. 5 (197~). 
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Third, there is the question of remedy. Respondents' re-
lief may well be limited to enjoining the Federal Government 
from providing funds to the Commonwealth. As we stated 
in Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S. 397, 420 (1970), welfare 
claimants were "entitled to declaratory relief and an appro-
priate injunction by the district court against the payment 
of federal monies ... should a state not develop a conforming 
plan within a reasonable period of time." There, we rejected 
the sugg~stion that the courts could require the state to pay 
the additional sums demanded by compliance with federal 
standards. Relying on King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309 (1968), 
we explained that "the State had alternative choices of assum-
ing the additional cost" of complying with the federal stand-
ard "or not using federal funds." ld. , at 420-421. Accord-
ingly, we remanded the case so that the State could exercise 
that choice. 
In other instances, however, we have implicitly departed 
from that rule and have affirmed lower court decisions enjoin-
ing a State from enforcing any provisions which conflict with 
federal law in violation of the Supremacy Clause, e. g., Carle-· 
son v. Remillard, 406 U. S. 598 (1972). In still other cases, 
we have struck down state laws without addressing the form 
of relief, e. g., Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971). In 
no case, however, have we required a State to provide money 
to plaintiffs, much less require a State to take on such open 
ended and potentially burdensome obligations as providing· 
"appropriate" treatment in the "least restrictive" environ-
ment. And because this is a suit in federal court, anything· 
but prospective relief would pose serious questions under the 
Eleventh Amendment. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 
(1974) . 
As I have suggested. these are all difficult questions. Be-
cause the Court of Appeals has not addressed these issues. 
however, I would remand the issues for· consideration in light 
of our decision here. 
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After finding that federal law impoEed an obligation on the 
States to provide treatment, the court below examined state 
law and found that it too imposed such a requirement. 612 
F. 2d, at 100-103. The court looked to § 201 of the Penn-
sylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966, 
which provides in pertinent part 
The Department of [Public Welfare] shall have power, 
and its duty shall be: 
( 1) To assure within the State the availability and 
equitable provision of adequate mental health and men-
tal retardation services for all persons who need them, 
regardless of religion, race, color, natural origin, settle-
ment, residence, or economic, or social status. 
Respondents contend that, even if we conclude that relief 
is unavailable under federal law, state law adequately sup-
ports the relief ordered by the Court of Appeals. There are, 
however, two difficulties with that argument. First, the 
lower court's finding that state law provides a right to treat-
ment may well have been colored by its holding with respect 
to § 6010. Second, the court held only that there is a right 
to "treatment," not that there is a state right to treatment 
in the "least restrictive" environment. As such, it is unclear 
whether state law provides an independent and adequate 
ground which can support the court's remedial order. Ac-
cordingly, I would remand the state law issue for reconsidera-
tion in light of our decision here. 
For similar reasons, I would also remand to the Court of 
Appeals those issues it did not address, namely, ~espondents' 
federal constitutional claims and their claims under § 504 of 
the Rehabilitation Act. 
VI 
Congress in recent years has enacted several laws designed 
to improve the way in which this Nation treats the mentally 
79-14G4-MEMO 
~P, PENNHU~T STATE SCHOOL v. HALDERMAN 
retarded.23 The Developmen~ally Disabled Assistance and 
Bill of Rights Act is one such law. It establishes a national 
policy to provide better care and tr-eatment to the retarded 
and creates funding incentives to induce the States to do so. 
But the Act does no more than that. In my view, we would 
be attributing far too much to Congress if we held that it 
required the States, at their own expense, to provide certain 
kinds of treatment. Accordingly, I would reverse the prin-
cipal holding of the Court of Appeals and remand for further 
proceedings along the lines indicated. 
28 E. g., The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended in 1974 and 1978, 
29 U. S. C. § 700 et seq .; The Education for All Handicapped Children 
Act of 1975, 20 U. S. C. §§ 1401-1420; Social Security Amendments of 
197 4, 42 U. S. C. §§ 1396d (d) and 1397; Community Mental Health Cen-
ters Act, 42 U. S. C . § 2689 et seq. 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
Dear Bill, 
~uttrttttt Qfcttrl of tltt 1lfuittb $>taft 
~frin.gton, ~. "f. 20bl~2 
February 11, 1981 
Re: 79-1404 - Pennhurst State School 
and Hospital v. Halderman 
I shall write partially dis~reeing with your 
memorandum in this case. - Although I agree that §6010 is not 
an attempt to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, it is part 
of a grant-in-aid statute, and the rights it declares or 
suggests must Q_e _ taken into account "lf a state chooses to 
participate- an<::rpr esentsa plan' to the Secretary for 
approval. The administrative view of the state's 
obligations will then be known by the state, and if it does 
not like it, it may terminate its interest. 
Furthermore, the rights referred to §6010 are 
enforceable in a §1983 action to the extent that a 
participating state must either implement them or cease 
receiving federal funds. There is nothing new in ~1983 
being used to ventilate a claim that a state plan is 
inconsistent with or inadequate under federal law, even 
though the Secretary and perhaps his lawyer, the Solicitor 
General, are on the side of the state. Here, of course, the 
Secretary's lawyer, who also happens to represent the United 
States, partially disagrees with him. 
My offering, which will be a dissent in the event you 
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Sincerely yours, .. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to the Confere~ce 
.... 
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To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Greg Morgan 
Re: No. 79-1404: Pennhurst State Sc~~~' 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST'S 
I find Justice Rehnquist's memorandum to be a sound 
disposition of this difficult case. The memorandum properly is 
limited to construing the statute and remanding to the CA for 
reconsideration of the appropriate remedy (Parts II & III). I 
think that the memorandum also properly points out some of the 
questions to be addressed upon remand (Part IV & V). 
I see that Justice White intends to write a 
memorandum disagreeing with Justice Rehnquist. On the basis of 
Justice White's sketch of his argument, I am inclined to 
recommend awaiting his memorandum, for the ambiguous Act at 
------------------------~ issue in this case is susceptible of more than one 
interpretation. On the basis of our discussions and your vote 
at Conference, however, I anticipate that we ultimately will 
side with Justice Rehnquist. 
I have one minor comment about Justice Rehnquist's 
memorandum. He addresses in n.l8 the part of the Act that I 
read to impose an obligation on both the federal and state 
governments: §6010 (3). Justice Rehnquist concludes that this 
subsection does not impose any affirmative obligation for two 
reasons. First, this subsection is merely a statement of 
2. 
federal policy, as are subsections (1) and (2) of §6010. 
Second, subsection (3) obligates states only to avoid funding 
substandard institutions; it does not obligate states to fund 
appropriate treatment for individuals. Because the whole 
import of this memorandum is to read §6010 as a hortatory 
statement of federal policy, I think that the first of the -------- ----------reasons in n.l8 suffices to dispose of the argument that 
......._ ____ ______ -- ---..._______ -~
subsection (3) affirmatively obligates the states. I find the 
distinction supporting the second reason to be rather strained, 
both because funding to institutions is funding to individuals 
and because the Act defines "institutions" broadly enough to 
include almost any place where retarded individuals reside. I 
therefore would recommend simply dropping the second reason 
from n.l8. 
This, however, is a very minor suggestion. 
Furthermore, I do not think that any harm will be done even if 
Justice Rehnquist is dead wrong in distinguishing institutions 
from individuals for this purpose. Congress did a miserable 
job of drafting the Act at issue in this case. The Act clearly 
is a "cut-and-paste" job done to accomodate a compromise 
between House and Senate. If this Court's construction of the 
Act reflects the Act's ambiguity, then Congress can try again 
to draft a clear statute. 
CHAMBERS OF 
_, 
;§up-umt <!Jcu:.rt of t4t~2t .:§hrlt$ 
~cwfrin-gfon, ~. <!J. 2!1blJ!;l 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
February 13, 1981 
Re: 79-1404 - Pennhurst State School v. 
Halderman 
Dear Bill: 
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February 16, 1981 
79-1404 Pennhurst 
Dear Bill: 
I think your memorandum is a sound disposition of 
this case, and will join an opinion along the lines you have 
written. 
Although I voted to reverse and remand for 
essentially the reasons you advance, I did view §6010(3) as 
perhaps imposing some obligation on both federal and state 
governments. On reflection, however, I think you are 
probably right in reading S6010 in its entirety as a 
statement of federal policy. In any event, as the Act is a 
"cut and paste" piece of legislation - with congressional 
intent almost incomprehensible - it is desirable for 
Congress to reconsider it. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
~UVttmt Qfourl of tJrt 'J!Utittlt ~~g 
~ag!p:ng-ton.lB. t!J. 20gt'!~ 
February 18, 1981 
Re: 79-1404 - Pennhurst State School and 
Hospital v. Halderman 
Dear Bill: 
Although I have some reservations about not 
deciding the state law question, I am persuaded 
that the disposition you propose is correct. I 
will join an opinion based on your memorandum. 
Respectfully, 
Justice Rehnquist 








To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Greg Morgan 
Re: Nos. 79-1404, etc: Pennhurst v. Halderman 
I have read Justice White's memorandum in this case. 
His principal disagreement with Justice Rehnquist's memorandum 
is over the interpretation of § 6010 of the Developmentally 
Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act. Justice White 
argues that § 6010 itself imposes obligations which states 
receiving federal money must meet as a condition to federal 
funding. Those obligations include, ~, the funding of 
"appropriate treatment" in the "lest restrictive environment." 
As would Justice Rehnquist, Justice White would remand the 
cases to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration of an 
appropriate remedy in light of this Court's construction of the 
-: " 
Act. 
You have told Justice Rehnquist that you will join an 
opinion written along the lines of his memorandum. I recommend 
staying with that position. To be frank, I find the Act so 
ambiguous that an argument could be made for any one of several 
interpretations. Justice White's interpretation is not 
unreasonable by any means. But I do think that Justice 
Rehnquist's interpretation makes more sense of the Act as a 
whole. He also reads the Act to be a funding statute and to 
impose certain obligations upon states as conditions to the 
2. 
receipt of federal funds. But he does not read § 6010 itself 
to impose obligations, such as the funding of "appropriate 
treatment." 
CHAMBE RS OF 
~u:prmtt C!Jcm:t of flrl' 'Jlhriteb ~ta:U.tr 
~rutfri:n:ghm, tB. <!J. 20~Jl.~ 
JU S TICE w .. . J . B R E NNAN, JR. March 11, 1981 
RE: Nos. 79-1404, 1408, 1414, 1415 & 1489 Pennhurst 
State School and Hospital, et al. v. Halderman 
Dear Byron: 
I am in general agreement with your memorandum 
in the above. 
Mr. Justice White 
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;~tL 
.§uprrmt <qou.rt of t~t 2Jlnitr~ .;%!1'!rlt1l 
1Uas lringtott. p. <q. 20c?JI-_;t 
C H A M BERS OF 
-JUSTICE THURGOOD MARS HALL 
March 11, 1981 
Re: Nos. 79-1404, 1408, 1414, 1415 & 1489 -
Pennhurst v. Halderman 
Memorandum to the Conference 
None of the memoranda as yet circulated 
in this case is entirely satisfactory to me. 
Rather than draft a lengthy one of my own, I 
sketch below the points I would address. 
1. No one involved in this litigation 
disputes that the conditions at Pennhurst are 
abysmal. 
2. Nor does anyone dispute that Congress 
had in mind Pennhurst and other institutions 
like it when it enacted the "bill of rights," 
§6010. 
3. The position taken by Bill Rehnquist 
is the most untenable: that Congress's deliberate 
effort to do something was merely hortatory. 
4. More tenable is Byron's view that 
Congress meant to condition funds on protection 
of those rights. But he neglects to give guidance 
on the hardest part of the case: the remedy. 
- 2 -
5. The remedy, of course, must follow from 
an understanding of the statute as a funding 
condition statute. The structure of state-
submitted plans, subject to federal approval and 
federal fund-cut-off, is a familiar device of this 
federalist system. It does have limits. The 
proper remedy for a violation of the obligations 
assumed by the state under this device must take 
into account the scope of substantive obligations, 
any limits imposed by the 11th amendment, and the 
limited enforcement powers of courts. 
6. In recognition of those limits, the ideal 
remedy is what the Court did in Rosado v. Wyman, 
397 U.S. 397 (1970) ~ to remand, and have the 
defendant propose either a plan to achieve compliance 
or else withdraw from the funding program. Byron 
refers to this solution but neglects the fact that 
at least part of it already was attempted here--
the District Court asked the defendant for a proposed 
compliance plan--and nothing ensued. So the next 
possibility is for a remand with an express opt-out 
option -- though this is problematic given that the 
state has wrongly been using the funds for several 
years now. 
7. An additional, alternative reason for 
remand would be to direct the lower courts to 
articulate an enforceable compliance plan. Of 
course, this puts us back at the nub of the problem: 
how to give definition to the amorphous rights at 
issue here. I think it is quite possible here to 
make the remedy track the statute, which required 
the participating state to create a state plan for 
developing individualized treatment programs, ~ 
themselves consistent with the statute's bill of 
rights. It is undisputed that these individual 
programs were never developed as required, and 
that the state-level plan failed to force their 
development. 






To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Greg Morgan 
Re: No. 79-1404: Pennhurst State School v. Halderman 
I have reviewed Justice Rehnquist's 2d draft. Most 
of the changes are minor. I draw your attention to two 
changes, however. 
(1) On page 21, Justice Rehnquists has added a 
couple sentences, the last of which reads: "Though Congress' 
power to legislate under the Spending Power is broad, it does 
not include surprising participating States with post-
acceptance or 'retroactive' conditions." This is a more clear-
cut statement of law than appeared in the 1st draft, but I 
think that this statement follows from Justice Rehnquist's 
discussion of the Spending Power on page 13. (The discussion 
on page 13 is the same in the 2d draft as the 1st.) 
Accordingly, I do not see any problem with this new statement. J ~ 
(2) On page 26, Justice Rehnquist has added a new 
footnote--number 23--in which he agrees in large part with 
Justice White's view of a proper remedy. I do not think that 
you will have any problem with this footnote, but I point it 
out because it makes an important statement that was not in the 
1st draft. 
.· 
.:§ttprtmt ('Jmtrl cf t4t ~b .:§taftg 
~~!p:ttgtcn.tB. <'J. 211.?~, 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
March 18, 1981 
RE: 79-1404, etc. - Pennhurst State School and Hospital 
et . al. v. Halderman, et al. 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
I find I agree with much of what both Byron and Bill 
have given us in memos on this case. 
However, to try to make headway I opt for Bill's 




.JUSTICE W>< . J . BRENNAN, .JR. 
~u:prtmt ~Clttt ot ttrt ~tlt .$!tate$' 
~zw!p:ttgLttt. :!B. <!):. 20 ~-'! .;1 
April l, 1981 / 
RE: Nos. 79-1404, etc. Pennhurst State School Cases 
Dear Byron: 
Please join me in the dissenting opinion you have 




cc: The Conference 
~ttprtlttt <!fonrl of tqt ~b" .§hdtil 
~ailJriugl:tttt. ~. <!J. 2UgtJ!..;l 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
April 1, 1981 







Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
;S;ttpumr <!four: of tlrr ~ttitcb .§taf'l'g 
'Ulaa-Jlinghttt. p. <!):. 20.?'~~ 
April 6, 1981 
Re: Nos. 79-1404, 1408, 1414, 1415, and 1489 -
Pennhurst S~ate School Cases 
Dear Byron: 
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